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ABSTRACT
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Thesis Director: Professor John D. Treadway

In 1890, Germany and Great Britain concluded the Treaty of Helgoland-Zanzibar,
which settled many of their numerous and complex colonial issues in Africa. The
territorial exchange of British-held Helgoland and German-held Zanzibar, which was part
of this agreement, had a major impact in its finalization. Indeed, without the HelgolandZanzibar swap, such a treaty most likely would never have occurred. Many hoped that
the Helgoland-Zanzibar agreement would usher in a new era in Anglo-German friendship
and, perhaps, lead to a formal alliance. Hence, during the 1880s, the seemingly unrelated
questing of a North Sea island and imperialist jostling in East Africa played a significant
role in Anglo-German relations.
This thesis explores the reactions to the treaty before, during and after its
negotiations and examines why an Anglo-Germany alliance never emerged following the
treaty’s conclusion and what impact the settlement had upon the events leading to the
outbreak of World War I.
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Chapter I
Introduction – Background of the Treaty and Historiography
The second half of the nineteenth century was an age of fervent imperialism.
Many Europeans, especially towards the end of the century, saw themselves on a mission
to civilize the world and, in the process, to increase the size and importance of their
motherland. This was the age of the “White Man’s Burden.” Many of the imperialistic
policies developed in the belief that this would help the less fortunate by expanding
wealth, creating new markets and obtaining additional resources. Along with these goals,
many countries were swept up by a jingoistic nationalism arising from the acquisition of
new territories and resources. None of the European great powers could resist colonial
temptations, including an old colonial nation, Great Britain, and the newly united German
Reich. The “New Imperialism” witnessed a scramble for colonies throughout the world
with Great Britain and Germany among those leading the charge. Nationalistic feelings
and imperialistic policies helped to promote the feeling throughout Europe that they and
their culture were far superior to any other, fostering these ideas even further.
As more and more countries became embroiled in the race for colonies, conflicts
were bound to arise, and so they did. Few, if any, countries were willing to go to war
over their newly acquired territories, and so European foreign policies soon became
intertwined with imperial issues. As Africa and Asia were being divided among the
European powers, numerous negotiations occurred to settle colonial differences without
going to war. Some of the resulting agreements were essentially spontaneous, while
others were forged after many months of sometimes tedious negotiations.

1

2

The Court of St James’ and the Wilhemstrasse confronted each other in Africa
and faced several disputes over their borders, especially in the East.1 The Anglo-German
Agreement of 1890, better known as the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty, settled most, if not
all, of the complex colonial issues that arose from the ambitions of Great Britain and
Germany in Africa. Its main focus was the settlement of colonial boundaries in Africa,
but the small islands of Zanzibar and Helgoland (also known as Heligoland), 2 the former
located off the coast of modern-day Tanzania and the latter off the coast of Germany in
the North Sea, were also included in this accord and had a large role in its completion.
Initially, London had no intention of including the island of Helgoland in its negotiations
with Berlin, but as time passed the British diplomats and officials offered to cede the
island in order to induce the Reich to relinquish its own claims to the island of Zanzibar,
which Britain had coveted for many years. Following the settlement of this treaty, many
in Great Britain and Germany hoped that a formal Anglo-German alliance would emerge.
This thesis investigates the importance of Helgoland and Zanzibar in the
negotiations of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 and explores the reactions of these
governments and presses to the treaty before, during and after its negotiations.
Furthermore, it examines why a formal alliance never happened between Great Britain
and Germany in the years after these two powers brokered this settlement and what
impact it had upon the events leading to the outbreak of World War I.

1

In particular the areas referred to are mostly in present day Tanzania.
Helgoland and Heligoland are both acceptable spellings for the name of the island. The
author will use the spelling of Helgoland throughout this paper, unless otherwise noted.
2

3

The British first came into possession of Helgoland in 1815 as part of the treaties
ending the Napoleonic Wars. Many Britons viewed Helgoland, strategically situated
between Britain and the German and Danish coasts, as an important piece in terms of
blockading the advance of a hostile European navy. Control of the island, located only
70 kilometers from the north German littoral, would allow Britain to blockade Germany's
river ports and interdict any hostile naval maneuvers, in the southeastern corner of the
North Sea. But with the passage of time, the strategic value of Helgoland steadily
decreased. 3 By 1890 it had become a financial burden to London and offered little
benefit, especially in terms of Britain’s defense.
By the same year, however, German diplomatic correspondence increasingly
mentioned the possible acquisition of Helgoland for geo-strategic purposes. Many, if not
most, Germans viewed Helgoland as Germania irredenta, contending that as Helgoland
had been a part of the defunct Holy Roman Empire, it therefore should once again be a
part of the new German Reich.4 In actuality, the majority of Helgolanders probably saw
themselves as either Danish or British, but this fact did not deter German nationalists.
As important as the Treaty of Helgoland-Zanzibar is, historians have had
relatively little to say about it and its impact upon Europe and the relationships among the
Great powers. In most cases, the agreement itself is only a footnote to general studies on
3

This was a rule which the British adhered to throughout the late nineteenth century and
up to 1918 in which the size of the British navy must be must always be larger than the
combined forces of the next two great naval powers. Prior to 1890, the second largest
naval power was France and, leading up to the First World War, that power was
Germany. Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 1814-1914 (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1992), pp. 378-379.
4
The one notable exception to this was Austria, which was excluded from the German
Reich in 1866-67 during the Second War of German Unification.
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Anglo-German relations, European diplomacy, and German and British policies in Africa
in the nineteenth century.5 Although the African component of the settlement has been
thoroughly examined, little research has been undertaken since 1985.6 Generally
overlooked in these studies is the military importance of the islands themselves,
especially that of Helgoland, the attitude of the island’s inhabitants, and, finally, the
views of those who helped negotiate the treaty.
Among several excellent books that examine classic Anglo-German relations and
European diplomacy in the late nineteenth century, two were written by William L.
Langer, namely European Alliances and Alignments, 1870-1890 and The Diplomacy of
Imperialism, 1890-1902.7 In both of these works, Langer interprets the Treaty of
Helgoland-Zanzibar as a step taken by the British in order to ensure the success of its
colonial policies in Africa, especially in East Africa. In his classic work, The Struggle for
Mastery in Europe, A. J. P. Taylor reaches a similar conclusion. Focusing more upon
Anglo-German relations are Raymond Sontag’s Germany and England: Background of
Conflict 1848-1894, and Paul Kennedy’s The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 18605

Raymond Sontag, Germany and England: Background of Conflict, 18481894 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964); Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of AngloGerman Antagonism, 1860-1914 (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1980); and Rich,
Great Power Diplomacy.
6
Such works include A. J. P. Taylor, Germany’s First Bid for Colonies, 1884-1885: A
Move in Bismarck’s European Diplomacy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1938), Woodruff
Smith, The German Colonial Empire (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1978), Helmuth Stoecker, German Imperialism in Africa: From the Beginnings until the
Second World War (London: C. Hurst, 1986), Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis,
Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1967).
7
William L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1870-1890 (New York: Alfred
Knopf, 1950), and The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902 (New York: Alfred Knopf,
1951).
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1914. The authors of these two works examine the effects the treaty had upon AngloGerman diplomatic relations.8
In Germany’s First Bid for Colonies, A. J. P. Taylor looks at Bismarck and how
he used the German acquisition of colonies as a way to promote Germany’s objectives in
foreign policy. As Taylor stat es, “the colonies served Bismarck as instruments of
influence in those areas where the British would be most sensitive – the colonies.”
Further on, he surmises that Bismarck anticipated, and perhaps even hoped, that through
negotiations over colonial disputes, Germany and Britain would reach an alliance that
would nullify any potential threats from France.9
Erich Eyck also views Bismarck’s sudden foray into imperialism from a European
perspective.10 Unlike Taylor, however, Eyck claims that Bismarck wanted to use
Germany’s colonies for domestic rather than diplomatic purposes. During the mid1880s, Bismarck faced opposition from a populace clamoring for Germany to obtain
overseas possessions. While many argue that Bismarck never really faced any serious
threat to his power, he nonetheless believed in the need to shift his colonial policy to
regain lost support. As Eyck argues, the Iron Chancellor’s new colonial policy won him
popular support, which was necessary to defeat his political opposition. Norman Rich, in

8

A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1954); Sontag, Germany and England; Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German
Antagonism.
9
Taylor, Germany’s First Bid for Colonies.
10
Erich Eyck, Bismarck and the German Empire (New York: Allen and Unwin, 1951)
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both his biography on Friedrich von Holstein and his general study on European
diplomacy during this period, agrees with Eyck.11
Taking another point of view, namely that Bismarck had fully embraced the idea
of a colonial empire, is Henry Turner, who held that the German chancellor in fact had
developed a strong desire for colonies which led to his policies for acquiring them.
Furthermore, he contends that Bismarck never intended to deceive the British, but that
problems arose due to the repeated failure of the latter to comprehend his change in
policy.12
Scholars of Anglo-German imperial relations often examine the HelgolandZanzibar treaty in considerable detail, but mainly from an African perspective, seeking to
explain why the British were willing to cede Helgoland to the Germans. Articles by
David R. Gillard and George N. Sanderson view this agreement as an extension of the
African policies of Lord Salisbury, the British prime minister and foreign secretary in the
late 1880s and early 1890s. The authors, however, disagree as to Salisbury’s motivations
and objectives.

11

Norman Rich, Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck
and Wilhelm II (Cambridge: University Press, 1965) and Great Power Diplomacy, 18141914 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990). Other scholars such as Woodruff Smith,
Helmuth Stoecker and Hans Ulrich Wehler are also in agreement with Rich and Eyck.
For more concerning this, see Smith, The German Colonial Empire and Stoecker,
German Imperialism in Africa, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus
(Berlin: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1969) and Eckart Kehr, Der Primat der Innennpolitik:
gesammelte Aufsätze zur preussisch-deutschen Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20.
Jahrhundert, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970).
12
Henry A. Turner, “Bismarck’s Imperialist Ventures: Anti-British in Origin?”, found in
Gifford and Lewis, Britain and Germany in Africa, pp. 47-82. Turner’s investigation that
the British were unable to understand Bismarck’s change in policy is interesting, but is
considered controversial and should be viewed with a little skepticism.

7

In “Salisbury’s African Policy and the Heligoland Offer of 1890,” Gillard asserts
that many historians viewed the treaty as a way for Salisbury to “prevent German
expansion towards Uganda and the headwaters of the Upper Nile.”13 Thus, he offered to
cede Helgoland to the Germans in order to safeguard Britain’s African interests, hoping
to gain an advantage in the settlement of other colonial questions. Gillard, on the other
hand, argues that the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty was made not to secure these areas, but
rather to gain control over what he viewed as the one problem spot, Zanzibar. By
agreeing to this exchange, he contends, Salisbury was able to “seek formal
acknowledgement by Germany of practically all British interests in Africa.”14
Unlike Gillard, Sanderson maintains that it was the Germans, not the British, who
had the upper hand in negotiations. With Bismarck’s sudden departure from the scene in
1890, Salisbury was put on the defensive. Shortly thereafter, Berlin, following the
decidedly imperialistic impulses of its new Kaiser, Wilhelm II, became very aggressive
with its African policy forcing Salisbury to make the offer of Helgoland in order to
secure British East Africa.15
Other early scholars also focused on the African side of the equation. In The Rise
and Fall of Germany’s Colonial Empire, 1884-1919, Mary Townsend portrays Germany

13

David R. Gillard, “Salisbury’s African Policy and the Heligoland Offer of 1890,”
English Historical Review, 75 (1960): p. 631. In particular, as will be shown, the
Germans were interested in acquiring the kingdom of Buganda. Buganda is located in
present day Uganda. Its boundaries then and now are marked by Lake Victoria to the
south, the Nile River to the east, Lake Kyoga to the north and the Kafu River to the
northwest.
14
Gillard, “Salisbury’s African Policy and the Heligoland Offer of 1890,”Ibid., p. 651.
15
George N. Sanderson, “The Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 and the Upper Nile,”
English Historical Review, 79 (1963): pp. 50-53.
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as anxious to secure a lasting alliance with Britain through the negotiations of the treaty.16
Just as important, Townsend focuses part of her analysis on the value the Germans placed
on Helgoland which includes a discussion of the change in policy, the “New Course.”
This is an idea which few scholars put forward before her. In The Rise of Anglo-German
Antagonism, Paul Kennedy agrees with Townsend, arguing that Berlin desperately
desired an alliance with the British and, thus, was willing to cede the island of Zanzibar if
it would lead to a stronger sense of Anglo-German friendship. Indeed, as Kennedy
demonstrates, many in Britain and Germany felt that the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty
would mark a resurgence in their relationship.
Oron J. Hale also views the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty with an emphasis on its
African component, but he does so from a completely differently point of view. In
Publicity and Diplomacy with Special Reference to England and Germany, he evaluates
the impact and pressure public opinion exerted on the officials in Germany and Britain
and the diplomatic relations between them.17 The downside to his investigation is that he
omits any analysis of the provisions of the agreement and avoids examining Salisbury’s
African policy and most significant portions of the treaty. Nonetheless, as Duane Pyeatt
states, “in confining his study to public opinion and its impact on the outcome of the
treaty and on German and British relations, Hale…agree[s] with those historians who

16

Mary Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany’s Colonial Empire (New York:
Howard Fertig, 1966). See also, Mary Townsend, Origins of Modern German
Colonialism, 1871-1885 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1974).
17
Oron J. Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy, with Special Reference to England and
Germany, 1890-1914 (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1940).
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emphasized the African portion of the treaty.”18 His study of public opinion emphasizes
the agitation over African colonialism. It was only to the Germans that Helgoland was a
factor in public opinion, but it was only minor.
In his recent work on the Anglo-German Agreement, George Drower, a historian
who specializes on British overseas territories, also examines the public opinion of the
treaty, but only from the British perspective and with little attention on Zanzibar.19 While
many Britons were in favor of acquiring Zanzibar, many others, including the Queen,
were equally opposed to handing over Helgoland and its people to the Germans. Such a
view emphasizes that the island was just as important a factor for the British in the
negotiations that took place as it was for the Germans. Although he does not investigate
the treaty from either the African or German perspective, his examination provides a
view few have ventured to consider.
Paul Hubbell’s work, The Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty of 1890, is one of a very
small corpus of works that does examine the Anglo-German agreement from the Reich’s
perspective.20 He goes into considerable detail concerning German policy and
Helgoland’s role in furthering Germany’s foreign aims. Although Hubbell examines the
debates over the treaty in the British parliament and German Reichstag, he only places
the agreement in the broader context of Anglo-German colonial policy. He makes little
mention of the exact importance of Helgoland or Zanzibar in the Anglo-German
18

Duane N. Pyeatt, Heligoland and the Making of the Anglo-German Colonial
Agreement in 1890 (Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech Press, 1988), p. 11.
19
George Drower, Heligoland: The True Story of the German Bight and the Island that
Britain Betrayed (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2003).
20
Paul Hubbell, The Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty of 1890 (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1937).
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Agreement. Hubbell’s investigation was also written in 1937, making it harder to view
the long-term effects of the treaty upon Anglo-German relations leading up to the First
World War. Duane Pyeatt, in Heligoland and the Making of the Anglo-German Colonial
Agreement in 1890, takes Hubbell’s work one step farther. Pyeatt begins to examine the
importance of Helgoland to Germany, but like most scholars before him, does not fully
examine public opinion regarding Helgoland or Zanzibar.
That earlier historians focus on the importance of Zanzibar in concluding this
settlement in 1890 is understandable, as the agreement itself most likely never would
have been concluded without its inclusion. In doing so, however, they have neglected a
large part of the treaty, namely the importance of Helgoland to both the Germans and the
British. The goal of this thesis, then, is to demonstrate the importance of both islands in
the making of the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty, and to show the reactions of London and
Berlin while it was being negotiated and afterwards. The interest of both sides in
concluding such an agreement and their reaction to it are essential in order to understand
better why such an arrangement did not lead to a closeness between the two countries,
even though the opposite was expected to occur.

Chapter II
African Colonization and the Need for an Anglo-German Agreement
While the apparent goal of the treaty signed in 1890 was the exchange of
Helgoland for Zanzibar, the principal motivation was the settlement of Anglo-German
colonial boundaries and disputes in Africa, especially in East Africa. Prior to 1890,
however, the acquisition of Helgoland was of relatively little importance to Bismarck and
was usually not even considered an issue associated with the African rivalries. It is
necessary, therefore, to understand how African disputes arose, what problems had to be
resolved and their role in creating an understanding between London and Berlin, before
discussing the 1890 Anglo-German Agreement of which Helgoland became an important
part.
German interest in Africa began as early as the 1850s, years before the unification
of Germany in 1871, when German merchants and traders began undertaking commercial
endeavors in western and eastern Africa.1 As he joined the “Scramble for Africa,” the
Iron Chancellor carefully calculated the short- and long-term consequences of this

1

The rise of German imperialism and colonialism in Africa and Asia started during the
1850s and would later coincide with the “Scramble for Africa,” which occurred in the
1880s. The initial efforts made by Germans included commercial and religious
endeavors which included the establishment of trade routes, factories, trading companies
and Christian missionaries. These undertakings occurred in Kamerun, Togoland,
Southwest Africa (present-day Namibia), East Africa (modern-day Tanzania), the
Samoan Islands, New Guinea and other surrounding islands in the Pacific. For more
concerning the early German imperialism see: Werner Haupt, Deutchlands Schutzgebeite
in Übersee, 1884-1918 (Freiburg: Podzun-Pallas Verlag, 1984); Helmut Washausen,
Hamburg und die Kolonialpolitik des Deutschen Reiches (Hamburg: Hans Christian
Verlag, 1968); Arne Perras, Carl Peters and German Imperialism: A Political Biography
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004); and Smith, The German Colonial Empire.
11
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decision. When discussing the outcome of Bismarck’s colonial policy, Paul Kennedy
puts it best when he says, “the number of birds Bismarck sought to kill with one stone is
truly remarkable.”2
The Germans began to extend their influence in Africa’s barren southwest in the
1850s. They launched new trade routes and established missions to convert the local
populace. In 1883, Adolf Lüderitz set up a factory at Angra Pequena, a town located on
the southern coast of present-day Namibia.3 The British, however, also desired territory
in the same general area. This raised the question of sovereignty, which, in turn, led to a
series of disputes between Britain and Germany that were only settled in 1884 when the
British recognized a German protectorate over Angra Pequena. Formal resolution of this
matter, however, was not reached until 1890 with the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty.
With the establishment of the Angra Pequena protectorate, then, Germany’s
plunge into colonialism had finally begun and the foundation for an African empire had
been laid. Conversely, at the same time, the Court of St. James held that the German
acquisition of colonies in Africa had been settled and it did not expect the Wilhelmstrasse
to add new territory there any time soon.
During the 1880s, Bismarck was also in the process of annexing the regions later
called Kamerun and Togoland.4 Germany had been interested in the west coast of Africa
where German missionaries and merchants had first set foot as early as the 1840s. The

2

Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 177.
After Germany established the colony of German Southwest Africa, Angra Pequena was
renamed as Lüderitz.
4
These are the German names for these lands. These areas are also referred to as
Cameroon and Togo. The author will use the German names, unless otherwise noted.
3
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British, however, were also vying for control in this area for trading purposes, creating a
rivalry that led to unrest in the 1880s. By the spring of 1884, a race had begun to see
whether the British or the Germans would contact the local chiefs first and secure the
area for their respective homeland. In the end, Germany acquired both Togoland and
Kamerun, but a few disputes concerning the borders of these new German territories still
arose. Nonetheless, both sides believed that “a friendly adjustment of the boundaries,”
would occur in West Africa. 5
In February 1885, during the Berlin Conference, Granville George LevesonGower, Lord Granville, the British foreign secretary, approached Bismarck, offering to
settle the disputes in West Africa.6 The negotiations did not resolve all of the conflicts,
but did result in the defining of “spheres of influence” which became a common process
for establishing further British and German expansion in Africa. Under this designation,
“both powers agreed not to interfere or to acquire any further territory in areas where the

5

Memorandum by Meade, 24 December 1884, enclosed in Malet to Granville, 24
December 1884, British Documents on Foreign Affairs (hereinafter cited as BDFA), Part
I, Series F: Europe, 1848-1914, vol. 18, Germany, 1848-1897, eds. Kenneth Bourne,
Cameron Watts and Christopher Seton-Watson (Frederick, MD: University Publications
of America, 1985), p. 231.
6
The Berlin Conference took place from 1884-1885 in Berlin with Bismarck as the host.
He invited representatives from Austria–Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, the United
Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden-Norway and the
Ottoman Empire. As a result of the conference, European colonization and trade in
Africa was regulated, as rules concerning the settling of colonies were established,
spheres of influence were created and the Belgian Congo was founded in Central Africa.
For more concerning the Berlin Conference see: Muriel E. Chamberlain, The Scramble
for Africa (London: Longman, 1974); Stig Förster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, and Ronald
Edward Robinson, Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884–
1885 and the Onset of Partition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Sybil E.
Crowe, The Berlin West African Conference, 1884–1985 (New York: Longmans, Green,
1981).
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other already had an interest,” and not to occupy any inland area that was located behind
the other power’s coastal territory. 7
Thus, for the most part, the German and British governments were able to settle
their differences in West Africa.8 As Pyeatt states, “each time Germany established a
colony, British public opinion denounced the action. Despite this, as in the case of
Cameroon, the two governments worked out most of the difficulties resulting from the
German acquisitions.”9 The development of German East Africa, however, presented
many problems that were very difficult to resolve. Indeed, several attempts to settle the
disputes were only made but they did not bring any long-term relief. As a result, a
different settlement was needed.
Germany began to establish its rule in East Africa in 1884, when Karl Peters, an
intrepid explorer for the Reich and founder of the Society for German Colonization, set
out to establish a protectorate along the east coast of Africa as part of the “New
Imperialism.” As bold and brash as his more famous British counterpart, Henry Stanley,
Peters arrived in Zanzibar in early November. Awaiting him there was a strongly worded
telegram from the secretary of state for foreign affairs, Paul Graf von Hatzfeldt zu
Trachenberg:
The Government understands that a certain Dr Peters has left for Zanzibar
in order to found a German colony in territory belonging to the Sultan of
7
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Zanzibar. Should the said Peters actually arrive in Zanzibar the German consul
is to inform him that he can expect neither the protection of the Reich nor even a
guarantee of his own life. Should he nevertheless pursue his plans he does so
entirely at his own risk and on his own responsibility.10
Despite the German government’s pronounced lack of support, Peters proceeded on his
quest.
Peters realized that speed was of the essence. He knew that if John Kirk, the
British Consul at Zanzibar, learned of the German expedition, he might intervene with
Sultan Barghash of Zanzibar to stop him. Therefore, in November 1884, Peters
immediately began negotiating treaties with native chiefs in Usagara, Useguha, Nguru
and Ukami, all located on mainland Africa east of Zanzibar, and quickly acquired both
sovereign right to and private ownership of extensive territory which would become the
German “Hinterlands.”11 After only five weeks in East Africa, the intrepid explorer
returned to Germany with his treaties in hopes of convincing his government to accept
them and establish a protectorate in East Africa.
When Peters arrived home in February 1885, news of his success was published
by Friedrich Lange, a high-ranking member in the Society for German Colonization and
the editor of the Tägliche Rundschau. As a result, the future of German involvement in
East Africa was widely discussed, with many people supporting Peters’s actions.
10
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According to Woodruff Smith, Bismarck bowed to the public opinion, and faced “the
dilemma of granting recognition to a protectorate of an area considered to be a sphere of
British influence.”12
Before granting recognition, however, Bismarck asked for a formal explanation of
the British position regarding East Africa and Zanzibar. Edward Malet, the British
ambassador to Germany, responded that although Britain had not officially “annexed the
territories, Her Majesty’s Government considered the prosperity and independence of the
Sultan important” to its interests, as London had developed extensive trade and influence
with the Sultans of Zanzibar and the territories under their control. 13 Nonetheless, since
there was no legal British claim to the area or an official protest to Germany’s previous
actions, Bismarck proceeded to acknowledge Peter’s protectorate on 27 February 1885.
Shortly thereafter, Kaiser Wilhelm I awarded a charter to the German Society for East
Africa (the new name for Peters’s company) for the control of the territories not under the
suzerainty of Britain, including Usagera, Naguru, Useghu and Ukami.14 Surprisingly (or
perhaps not so), the extent and boundaries of these territories were not explicitly defined
and based only upon their names.
Precisely why Bismarck decided to embrace Peters’s landgrab is open to question.
Perhaps, as Henderson suggests, the German chancellor realized that “prompt action must
be taken if Germany were not to be left empty-handed in the last scramble for African
12
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colonies.”15 It is just as likely, however, that he saw some value in an area which he
could use to his advantage in future negotiations with Great Britain. Whatever the
reason, Germany had gained a sizable amount of territory and control over East Africa by
March 1885.
The initial British response to the German action was surprisingly measured.
While Herbert von Bismarck, the German foreign minister, was in London negotiating a
settlement concerning Kamerun, Granville informed the German chancellor's son that
Britain “recognized the ‘hinterlands’ now claimed by Germany,” and that he did not
interpret this action “as a threat to the security of Zanzibar.” At the same time, he
reminded the younger Bismarck that the island was very important to the British and that
it was their goal to maintain the Sultan’s independence. Any “objections to the [German]
presence in East Africa would arise only if [Germany] inhibited free trade.”16 Given the
potential for a serious conflict in East Africa, Bismarck welcomed Granville’s statements.
The British acceptance of the new German presence in East Africa was short
lived, however, as the Germans continued to expand their holdings and interest in the
region. London became notably concerned when Dr. Gerhard Rohlfs, an experienced
African traveler, was sent to Zanzibar and appointed General Consul in April 1885. In
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May, two brothers, Clemens and Gustav Denhard, were granted protection by Berlin for
land they had acquired in Witu in northern East Africa.17
The British government had initially been told that the aim of Rohlfs’ mission to
Zanzibar was to negotiate a commercial treaty with Sultan Barghash. As it turned out,
his agenda was far more extensive. Rohlfs also proposed defining the boundaries of
Germany’s possessions, and demanded that the Sultan recognize a German protectorate
over Witu and the territory which it had already acquired.18 Encouraged by John Kirk,
Barghash protested vehemently. Concluding that Britain was attempting to hinder its
colonial ambitions, Bismarck in turn lodged a protest to the British ambassador in Berlin.
Malet assured the Chancellor that the British would not limit German objectives, and
ordered Kirk to dissuade the Sultan from opposing Germany.19 As a result, conflict
between the two European powers was averted, albeit only for a short while.
The Sultan, still displeased over being compelled to accept the German expansion
around Zanzibar, soon attempted to resist the Germans again, this time with armed force.
Despite continued assurances from Britain to the contrary, the Germans believed that
Kirk was behind the Sultan’s obstinacy. With negotiations stalling, Bismarck settled
upon sending a squadron from the Imperial German Navy to the coast of Zanzibar “to
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obtain the Sultan’s recognition of [German] claims.”20 In order to downplay this,
however, he also suggested the establishment of an international commission to hear, and
ultimately settle, the Sultanate’s protest. London readily agreed to the idea, partially
because it needed German support in its intensifying conflict with Russia over
Afghanistan. Bismarck ultimately succeeded and the Sultan recognized the German
protectorates on 14 August and withdrew his complaints against Germany.
The following year, Britain and Germany concluded the Anglo-German
Agreement of 1886, which defined the Sultan’s territory and established respective
spheres of influence. Both countries agreed to refrain from interfering or obtaining land
in the other’s sphere and limited the Sultanate’s control to a coastal strip eight to sixteen
kilometers between the Rovuma and Tana Rivers. In exchange for British support for
leases on Dar-es-Salaam and Pangani, which Barghash controlled, Germany agreed to
recognize the Sultan’s sovereignty and independence.21 Meanwhile, Karl Peters was still
working on fulfilling his dream of creating a large colonial territory in East Africa. As a
result, he turned his attention to the regions north of the Tana River, particularly Buganda
and Equatoria, which were not included in this treaty.
The leaders of Europe thought that Equatoria was under the control of the
Mahdists, but in 1886 they discovered that Emin Pasha was still in power there and was
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appealing to Britain for support.22 Consequently, in the words of Henderson, “there was a
clamour in England that action should be taken to rescue the last of General Gordon’s
lieutenants [Emin Pasha]. Money was raised by a relief committee and an expedition was
fitted out and entrusted to the leadership of H. M. Stanley.” Although Stanley was unable
to locate him after extensive searching, he continued to push into the Upper Nile Valley.
23

In 1888, Peters formed a German search party to find the still missing Emin
Pasha. He reasoned that if Stanley had failed to acquire Equatoria for the Imperial British
East Africa Company during his search for Emin, there might still be a chance for
Germany to secure it, and Buganda.24 During his expedition, then, Peters proposed “to
found a state under German protection the nucleus of which would be Emin Pasha’s
territory.… To the east it would stretch to Witu and to the Indian Ocean.… Uganda and
22
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the whole Victoria Nyanza would naturally be included” – quite a large swath of territory
in East Africa. 25
After several delays, the German expedition reached the East African mainland in
1889.26 Peters marched to the border of Equatoria where he discovered the camp of two
Englishmen who were out hunting. Peters had no “scruples with regard to reading their
correspondence and he learned that Stanley had found Emin Pasha.”27 Peters, however,
was undeterred. Even though his original plan had failed, he found out from the
Englishmen that Mwanga, the King of Buganda, had appealed to the British for aid
against the Muslims who deposed him. Since he could not recover Emin, Peters decided
to travel to Buganda where he restored Mwanga to his throne. Subsequently, the King of
Buganda signed a treaty with Peters, placing his territories under German protection.
During this period of East African rivalry, Salisbury attempted to keep the Nile
and Egypt under British control and maintain the best possible relations with Germany.
News concerning Equatoria and Buganda, however, troubled him. Furthermore, as
Gifford and Lewis state, the Germans’ “control of Witu and the lakes region gave them
[the Germans] an excellent opportunity to surround British East Africa and, more
25
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importantly, gain control of the Upper Nile.”28 With a growing rivalry and the prospect
of further German expansion, Salisbury sought a compromise with Berlin, offering a
settlement of disputes in 1889. Bismarck, who presumed he would have the upper hand
in the negotiations, was willing to parley.
Besides the controversies in East Africa, it is clear that the two governments also
had many difficulties to overcome in West and South West Africa if they were to reach
an understanding. After a hopeful start, negotiations stalled, and it looked as though
nothing would be accomplished. When Joseph Chamberlain, the British colonial
secretary, suggested adding Helgoland to the offer, however, the situation rapidly
changed, and Salisbury used the German desire for this North Sea island to his advantage
during these often tense colonial negotiations.
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Chapter III
“Pearl of the North Sea” or “Freezeland?” British Reactions Towards Helgoland
The island of Helgoland may have been small, but it played an increasingly large
role in Anglo-German diplomacy, largely due to the importance the British and German
governments assigned to it. The British Admiralty, for example, initially regarded the
island as strategically important and worth retaining.1 Alfred Mahan detailed the
historical importance of Helgoland to the British calling it the, “Pearl of the North Sea
and the cornerstone of British naval strategy” in the region. 2
As the nineteenth century progressed, however, the British attitude towards
Helgoland changed. The Colonial Office, for example, which held administrative control
over the island, had little regard for it, shifting control from department to department for
little reason other than to balance the workload of the clerks.3 By the 1880s, the British
Parliament was still unwilling to provide Helgoland with enough money to build a muchneeded harbor or even to fortify it. London surmised that if it could gain certain
advantages from Germany, it would be easy to cede it.
In 1880, approximately 2000 people lived on Helgoland whose size is about four
square kilometers. Culturally, ethnically and linguistically the people are closely related
to the Frisians, but despite these close links, the islanders always perceived themselves as

1

Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, The Life of Granville George Leveson Gower, Second Earl
Granville, K. G., 1815-1891 (London: Longmans Green, 1905), p. 361.
2
Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1894), vol. 2, pp. 276-277.
3
Brian L. Blakeley, The Colonial Office, 1865-1892 (Durham: Duke University Press,
1972), p. 51.
23

24

unique: Helgolanders. There is some justification for this sense of exceptionalism.
Helgoland had never been constitutionally associated with any of the Frisian Islands and
the people had their own distinct dialect, Helgolandish, which they used when speaking
among themselves and which is almost incomprehensible to outsiders.4
The British acquisition of Helgoland in 1814, as Paul Knaplund aptly put it,
was a, “symbol and instrument of naval power and nothing else.”5 Knaplund, however,
was only partially correct in his assessment of Helgoland’s role during the Napoleonic
Wars. While possession of the island most certainly did not determine the war’s final
outcome, the island did hold some strategic value. Vice-Admiral Thomas Russell, the
commander-in-chief of the British North Sea fleet, attached so much importance to it that
when he learned that Denmark had declared war on Britain in 1807, he immediately
headed for Helgoland intending to isolate the Danish garrison while awaiting further
instructions. When he arrived, he sent word to the Admiralty of his actions, expressing
himself as such: “So strongly, Sir, am I impressed with the propriety of the measure [the
seizure of Helgoland], that, had I any force to spare, I should immediately take it, with
the hope that I should anticipate their lordship’s intentions.”6 Russell was not the only
one who was enthusiastic about taking Helgoland for the British. In a letter to the editor
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in The Times, a group of merchants “urge[d] the government to take the island,” as they
had “trade interests in Hamburg…and fear[ed] that the French would soon be able to
stifle imports.”7 The traders also emphasized that acquiring Helgoland would be in
Britain’s best interest by protecting its trade in the North Sea, especially during the war.
In addition, the British government already determined control of Helgoland to be
of the utmost importance. It believed that if the Danes continued to hold the island, ships
carrying letters would not be able to operate in their normal fashion and prevent much
needed communications between London and its continental allies. Furthermore,
Helgoland could be used as a war depot for naval supplies, which would prevent the navy
from having to travel back to Britain to re-supply. As a result, on 4 September 1807,
Admiral Russell, acting upon orders from the British government, seized Helgoland.
When the Napoleonic Wars finally ended in 1815, Great Britain retained full
sovereignty over Helgoland in accordance with the Treaty of Kiel.8 London assumed
control and Sir Edward Thornton, a minister assigned to the island, continued to use the
constitution that Denmark granted to the Helgolanders. Although Helgoland received a
small annual grant from Britain to cover the cost of employing a handful of Britons to
assist with the territory’s administration, the expenditures for this civil staff remained
fixed for many years. Such action demonstrated that the Colonial Office was very cost-
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conscious concerning the island. Indeed, the advantages and disadvantages of this British
possession fluctuated over the years, “being influenced primarily by the changing
political structure of Europe, particularly the unification of Germany, naval
considerations, trade, and the cost of administering the island itself.”9
From the British perspective, the military importance of Helgoland drew a varied
response following the Napoleonic Wars. During the Crimea War, refortification of the
island was discussed, although not undertaken, in order to prevent Russia from making a
possible diversion in Northern Europe to counter the campaign at Sevastopol.10
Helgoland’s importance grew even larger with the passage of the British Foreign
Enlistment Act of 1854. This bill strengthened existing laws permitting the government
to enlist foreign aliens into the regular army. The German states provided a large number
of “volunteer” and mercenary troops for Britain, but with the German Confederation
declaring its neutrality in the Crimean conflict, British agents in Germany were forced to
move the newly recruited troops quickly and secretly out of the country. 11 This made
Helgoland, with such close proximity to the German mainland, instrumental in the British
9
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government’s plans by using the island as a place to muster the troops. The government
further supported this effort by constructing several barracks on the island.
The use of Helgoland as a base, however, was not as successful as many had
hoped. While the military’s presence gave a great boost to the island’s economy, several
problems also arose, including a constant shortage of food in the winter and lack of water
in the summer. The biggest concern, however, was that the few recently built barracks on
the island were insufficient for stationing as many as 5,000 men there. Furthermore,
since the Colonial Office would not release more funds to build more barracks, there was
no solution for housing so many soldiers.12 As a result, then, the British never really
considered Helgoland as a practical place for such large-scale military activities.
In 1870, military interest in Helgoland revived again as a result of the FrancoPrussian War. Even though the British were officially neutral in the conflict and still
unwilling to fortify the island, they increased their naval presence around the German
coast. The greatest potential threat, however, came from the French, who dispatched
ships to the waters around the island. As Drower states, “not since the ‘continental
system’ of the Napoleonic wars had there been so many ships anchored in the Heligoland
roadstead.”13 The reason Paris sent ships there were twofold: to promote a Danish
alliance and to prepare for the possible landing of French troops in Schleswig. Using
Helgoland as a base of operations might have facilitated both goals. Britain, however,
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made it clear that, “the neutrality of the island would be strictly observed,” and would not
permit the French to use the island under any circumstances.14
Official British neutrality notwithstanding, the Helgolanders, sensing a once-in-alifetime opportunity, undertook to sell provisions, in particular coal, to the numerous
French ships so close at hand. Although in the end, London ordered Henry Maxse, the
British Governor of Helgoland at the time, to stop these activities because they blatantly
violated Helgoland’s neutrality, the effects of the French exploitation of the island did not
go unnoticed by the Germans. Indeed, such maneuvers made them keenly aware of the
importance of Helgoland being controlled by Germany or, at the very least, a friendly
power. This helps explain the Reich's generally pro-British attitude after 1871 and its
strong interest in acquiring the island.
Although British control of the island was occasionally jeopardized during times
of war, London still failed to take any steps to fortify Helgoland. In 1860-61, for
example, Governor Richard Pattinson’s sought to raise a local volunteer militia.
Although he was initially successful, his plan ultimately failed because the Colonial
Office refused to pay for much-needed ammunition. In another case, in October 1871, a
battery of 12-pounder Armstrong guns was sent to the island, but it was never used to fire
upon hostile ships during wartime. As the German Newspaper Kreuz Zeitung remarked,
they were only to be used for firing fog signals and salutes, and
were not perceived as having any defensive function. There were anxieties
that the accompanying stocks of gunpowder would run out anyway, Britain
being too tight-fisted to ensure that supplies were regularly delivered.15
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Further altering Britain’s view as to Helgoland’s value as a military outpost was
the unification of Germany in 1871. Traditionally, the British had used the island as a
possible counter-weight to French expansion into the German Confederation. A strong
united Germany could now stand on its on and prevent any further French aggression. As
a result, the principal reason for Britain’s original interest in Helgoland fell by the
wayside.
Even so, many in Whitehall continued to view the island as a potentially
important shipping and trading post. Britain encouraged commerce on Helgoland by
allowing ships built on the island to have the same privileges that its own ships enjoyed.
By doing so, exports and duties on goods carried by the Helgolander’s ships would be
lower, thus significantly reducing the price of goods and increasing trade between the
British and the islanders. By fostering an increase in trade, Britain hoped the people on
the island would become more self-sufficient and would not have to lean as heavily on
the government for financial support.
As it happened, gambling was the most profitable venture for the Helgolanders
and contributed the most to the island’s revenues. Seizing upon this opportunity to help
reduce the burden of Helgoland’s heavy debt, the British passed a tax on gambling. The
islanders, however, seeing this act as an infringement of their “Ancient Rights, began to
protest. The tax was repealed in March 1865, but the victory was only short lived. By
1871, numerous scandals finally forced the Helgolanders to close their gambling halls.
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With the closure of the gambling tables, the only other viable industry for the
Helgolanders was tourism. As early as 1826, Jakob Andressen Siemens, a Helgoland
carpenter, came up with the idea of turning tiny Sandy Island, located on the western side
of Helgoland, into a bathing resort. Similar tourist spots had been established as early as
1830, but were not initially very popular and soon fell into decay. By the 1860s,
however, Siemens’s vision came to fruition. The islanders rebuilt the earlier retreats
adding such amenities as swimming baths and a vertical lift to carry passengers and
goods between the lower and upper towns. The principal streets were also repaved and a
Coversationshaus (Conversation House) was built which frequently organized balls and
concerts and contained a reading room that was amply filled with newspapers and books.
By the 1880s such improvements had turned Helgoland into a popular resort spot,
especially since “sea bathing became a popular ‘cure’ in the nineteenth century.”16
Visitors ranged from princes to merchants, and came from all over Europe. These
ventures were lucrative, but much of the money went to private investors who helped
construct these developments and did not help resolve Helgoland’s chronic debt
problems.
As it happens, most of the tourists who made their way to Helgoland were not
British. To be sure, some British visitors to Helgoland were attracted to the island’s
towering red cliffs, rocky shores and unpredictable sands, but Britain already had
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embraced dozens of other small island colonies throughout the Empire, many of which
were tropical. 17 In comparison, Helgoland was rather unexceptional.
Initially, few in Britain really knew much about the island at all. Although artistic
representations of the island were made, such as sculptures and paintings, the public
seldom had the chance to view them. While the 1851 Great Exhibition at Crystal Palace
and the 1886 Colonial Exhibition in London permitted the general populace the
opportunity to gain some idea about Britain’s colonies, the government deemed
Helgoland too diminutive to be considered worthy of representation. In 1856, a sculpture
of Alfred the Great clutching a Helgoland-style Frisian boat was unveiled at the Royal
Academy, but it was then permanently located within the Houses of Parliament, “in a
spot so obscure that no one had a chance to associate it with Helgoland.”18 In the 1880s
Hamilton Macallum, a distinguished Royal Academician, visited Helgoland and painted
many images of the island. His works were exhibited in London – but in the Grosvenor
Gallery, where only a privileged few could view them. M L’Estrange wrote a detailed
and captivating account of her life on Helgoland called Heligoland, or Reminiscences of
Childhood. It became a bestseller and was reprinted four times in the 1850s. Still, few in
Britain seemed to have the desire to visit.
Perhaps the construction of new harbors would have facilitated an increase in
trade and tourism. The British Parliament, however, was too parsimonious to do so
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finding it hard to justify “spending money on Heligoland when so much needed to be
done for harbors in England.”19
After the Franco-Prussian War, Colonel Terence O’Brien, Governor Maxse’s
successor, 1881-1888, turned to the Colonial Office in yet another attempt to secure new
harbors. In 1883, things looked up -- briefly -- when John Coode, an eminent engineer,
was sent to Helgoland to complete a feasibility study.20 According to The Times, Coode
made a “huge, beautifully coloured plan of the Lower Town, on which he showed how
east and south piers might be constructed for a cost of some £60,000.”21 In the end,
however, nothing was done.
Hope revived in 1885 after a report by the Parliamentary Select Committee on
Harbors and Refuge acknowledged Helgoland’s great value to British fisherman who
worked along Dogger Bank and Helgoland Bight. The committee observed that “the
island had the potential to be of even greater importance if a proper graving dock were
constructed there for the repair and maintenance of British fishing vessels.”22
Reluctantly, the Colonial Office agreed to construct one of the piers Coode
recommended. Despite the construction of a new pier, the governor’s reports for
Helgoland continued to show deficits. Reports from 1888 and 1889 showed diminished
savings in the postal savings bank, a decline in the population, and losses in tax and toll
19
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revenues. Such decreases in income were especially problematic as the island was
constantly suffering from an annual debt of approximately £8000 sterling due to low
incomes and the cost of maintaining a fleet on the rough North Sea.
Due to the general public’s lack of interest in the island and its financial
liabilities, it is understandable why many in the British government were willing to
contemplate trading it to another country, most notably Germany. 23 On March 30, 1885,
Henry Holland, Lord Knutsford, a member of the Royal Commission on Colonial
Defense and Protection of Trade, stated in the House of Commons that, “from a
strategical point of view Helgoland was of no use to this country.”24 Eldon Gorst, a
Member of Parliament from Chatham, thereupon actually proposed giving the island to
the German government. Such an act of one-sided generosity was given little serious
consideration at the time, but as years passed, London became more amenable to the
possibility of jettisoning the island.
Queen Victoria's attachment to the island notwithstanding, Salisbury found no
purpose in retaining the island for reasons of "sentiment."25 Indeed, Salisbury’s foreign
policy was too sophisticated to let such feelings stand in the way of diplomatic progress
elsewhere, especially in more important areas such as East Africa.
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Chapter IV
German Desires for Helgoland and Helgoland’s Role in Anglo-German Diplomacy
Prior to 1890
While many Britons viewed Helgoland as a rather unexceptional bit of territory,
for a majority of Germans quite the opposite was true. Along with the island’s towering
red cliffs, German tourists were drawn to the windswept island because of its surprising
local fauna of elms and linden trees, and rose and lilac bushes.1 These attractions were
even more alluring due to the countless seagulls and other migratory birds that flocked to
the island. Numerous German visitors were enchanted by a “mesmerising, magical sense
of a charmed island which had somehow survived the rigours of fierce storms yet
remained beautiful,” which “added to the sense of the place as a whimsical paradise.”2
Over the course of the nineteenth century Helgoland attracted many German
writers, artists and musicians. Composers such as Anton Bruckner, Franz Liszt, Hans
von Bülow, Gustav Mahler and Gustav Schönleber all paid visits. Rudolf Jordan’s
dramatic oil painting Sturmläuken auf Helgoland depicted a typical scene with the
Helgolanders rushing about a street during a violent storm. Famous writers also
frequented Helgoland, including Franz Kafka, August Strindberg, Christian Friedrich
Hebbel and Heinrich von Kleist. One particularly enthusiastic visitor was the German
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travel writer Karl Reinhardt, whose glowing account of his trip attracted countless other
visitors to the island. 3
Perhaps the most important German visitor to the island, however, was the poet
August Heinrich Hoffmann. Born at Fallersleben in Lüneburg in 1798, he rose through
the academic ranks to become a full professor at the University of Breslau. As a result of
a political critique published in 1840 expressing National-Liberal views, he was forced to
surrender his professorship and leave Prussia. Hoffmann was one of many Prussian
intellectuals who, to the bemusement of many of the down-to-earth inhabitants of
Helgoland, saw the island as the embodiment of German virtues and the “Germanic
spirit.” On 28 August 1841, while being sheltered as a political exile there, he penned
“das Lied der Deutschen” under the name of Hoffmann von Fallersleben. This song was
an emotive work that pleaded for a unified Germany to take precedence over the
numerous states of the fragmented German Confederation.4 The work attained great
prominence in Germany, so much so after the First World War his poem became the
lyrics to the country’s national anthem, and remains so to this day.5
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The strategic importance of Helgoland was also of great significance to many
Germans. The island’s military value was recognized as early as 1848 when the
Frankfurt Parliament, the provisional German government, began to rethink its naval
strategy.6 This early naval planning was to have a large effect on the future of Helgoland.
In 1849, a relatively unknown Prussian diplomat wondered if widening the barge canal
that cut across the Jutland Peninsula and connected the North Sea to the Baltic might
increase the effectiveness of the Prussian Navy.7 This man was none other than Otto von
Bismarck, who, with amazing foresight, contemplated acquiring the necessary land rights
that could eventually serve as the basis for what would become the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal
(popularly known as the Kiel Canal). For the time being, however, he put aside this plan
while he focused on more pressing affairs of state.
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The planners of the fledgling “German” fleet also grew increasingly concerned
about possible British attack in the North Sea, a fear that intensified following the
creation of the German naval base at Wilhemshaven. 8 With a naval base located only a
few kilometers inland in the muddy Jade estuary, the Germans believed their base was
potentially vulnerable to a blockade by a British fleet located off the North Sea coast.
Following the First Schleswig War of 1848-1851, Prussia realized that it would need to
establish a strong navy in order to prevent a naval blockade in the North and Baltic Seas.9
As a result, in 1853, Prince Adalbert of Prussia concluded the Jade Treaty with the Grand
Duchy of Oldenburg according to which Prussia received approximately three square
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kilometers of Oldenburg’s territory at the Jadebusen.10 It was on this land that, in 1869,
Wilhelm I, the King of Prussia, established the town of Wilhelmshaven as a base for
Prussia’s infant navy.11
In 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War, Prussia saw firsthand the strategic
importance of Helgoland.12 Even though the British-controlled island remained officially
neutral territory, the French were nonetheless able to exploit the island in blockading the
navigable estuaries in the Bight, while also engaging in trade with the islanders for coal
to fuel their ships. While the Prussians eventually won the war, they felt humiliated by
the way the French had managed to use Helgoland to their advantage during the conflict.
In the words of Ludwig von Henk, a commander of the Prussian North Sea fleet during
the war,
Which Prussian naval official has not felt bitter, that, in spite of a benevolent
neutrality of the Governours of Helgoland at that time, the French fleets not only
10
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anchored at the island, but also were able to refill their coal and other stores
under the protection of the same ones [the governours]?13
As a result, Berlin made an even stronger push to gain possession of the island by any
means possible because, in the opinion of German naval leaders, “Helgoland form[ed] the
keys to our war harbor on the Jade, as well as to both large waterways the Elbe and
Weser, and above all controls the Ems area.” By controlling the island, the German Navy
could “station a branch of the more armored, heavily armed vehicles, as well as the small
fast torpedo boats, the most effective support for maritime operations [against] a hostile
fleet operating against the North coast of Germany. “14
In order to bring this plan to fruition, Vice-Admiral Eduard von Jachmann
proposed to the recently formed Imperial government that Germany should acquire
Helgoland. Knowing that Britain had abandoned “unwanted” colonies in the past,
Jachmann hoped that Helgoland might fall into this category.15 In February 1871, while
Germany and France were discussing the terms of what became the Treaty of Frankfurt,
the newly formed Reichstag contemplated requiring Paris to cede Pondicherry to the
Reich. Pondicherry was the capital of French India and consisted of a beautiful enclave
of 775 square kilometers along the Indian coast.16 More importantly, it was adjacent to
British-held Madras. The Germans contemplated using Pondicherry as a bargaining chip
with Britain in exchange for Helgoland. When reports of such a proposition reached
13
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London, Lord Granville, the foreign secretary, asked the War Office and the Admiralty
about their positions on Helgoland. In the end, nothing came of this idea, but it does
underscore the lengths to which some Germans were willing to go in order to acquire
Helgoland for the Reich. As it happens, a large part of the French indemnity provided for
in the Treaty of Frankfurt, was used to support the new German naval program.
Moreover, Count Leo von Caprivi, the chief of the admiralty and later Bismarck’s
immediate successor as German chancellor, still had plans for Helgoland in Germany’s
naval defense, but he left the details to Admirals Albrecht von Stotsch and Alfred von
Tirpitz.17
By the mid-1880s, Bismarck was able to return to his plan to build a canal across
the Jutland peninsula. The future Kaiser Wilhelm Canal would be a 98-kilometer
shipping lane that would link the North Sea and Baltic Sea and greatly decrease the
sailing distance between Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, allowing an entire fleet to move
quickly and safely across German territory from one sea to the other. 18 In 1884, to
remove any potential risk of a British blockade of the western end of the canal, Caprivi
suggested to Bismarck that the Helgoland question be raised again with Britain. The Iron
17

Tirpitz’s original plan called for elaborate engineering schemes creating a “huge harbor
at Helgoland and heavy fortifications on the island to make a close blockade of the coast
impossible.” The thinking was to strengthen Germany’s naval defenses in any future
wars against France. The offensive part of his plan consisted of “a large fleet to bombard
key French ports” and to “engage the French fleet on the high sea.” The development of
the torpedo, however, lessened the need for acquiring Helgoland since ships in a
blockade would no longer be safe in shallow waters near the island. See Grand Admiral
von Tirpitz, My Memoirs (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1919), vol. 2, pp. 4954 and 88-90 for more information.
18
Since 1948, the canal has been known as the Kiel Canal. Construction began in 1887
and was finished in 1895. It stretched from the Elbe River above Brunsbüttel to the
Baltic Sea at Holtenau above Kiel.

41

Chancellor, who found himself in the thick of colonial affairs at the time, promised
Caprivi he would take care of the matter. 19
On 5 May 1884 Bismarck nevertheless instructed Count Georg Herbert zu
Münster, Germany’s ambassador in London, to reaffirm Berlin’s desire for cordial
relations with Britain. At the same time, he asked Münster to inform Whitehall that, “a
further test of England’s intention to continue to maintain friendly relations with us
depends on the question of Helgoland.” In Bismarck’s words, “this purely German
island in the possession of England is nothing more nor less than a jumping-off point for
attacks on the mouth of the Elbe and the West coast of Holstein” by the British. A
resolution of the Helgoland question, he continued, “would make a very favourable
impression upon German public opinion… and also facilitate for us our benevolent
attitude towards British policy.” He also suggested that an Anglo-German treaty might
be struck with terms very favorable to Great Britain: “If it [Helgoland] belonged to
Germany, we should be prepared to face the expense of providing it with a harbor of
safety,” for the lack of one, “has caused year by year considerable loses to the various
merchant Navies (including the British).”20
Several days later, on 8 May, Münster, who was personally delighted with
Bismarck’s instructions, finally had the chance to discuss Helgoland with Frederick
19
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Stanley, Lord Derby, the colonial secretary, while they were shooting together at
Knowsley. Derby, having received an official letter from Colonel O’Brien, the governor
of Helgoland, remarked, “This perfectly useless rock in the North Sea, the smallest of our
colonies, gives me the most trouble of any.” Münster retorted in turn, “If the rock seems
so useless to you, you should make it useful by building a harbour of refuge or else hand
it over to the Germans.” Derby then quipped back, “If Germany would undertake to
build a harbour of refuge, which would cost at least £250 000, there might be some use in
talking about it.”21 Remembering his new orders from Bismarck, Münster waited for a
convenient opportunity to have more serious discussions.
One week later, on 17 May, Münster met Lord Granville, the foreign secretary, at
the Foreign Office for a routine discussion on various topics. Towards the end of their
session, the German ambassador raised the question of Helgoland. Playing on Britain’s
disinclination to spend money on fortifications on the island, he reasoned that
“Heligoland was a place of no importance to Britain in its present state, whereas it would
be of immense importance to Germany, to Britain, and to the whole of the world, if it
were made into a harbour refuge.” Furthermore, he stated, “Count Bismarck wished to
cut a canal into the Baltic, which would also be a great advantage to Britain, as the most
powerful maritime nation in the world, and Heligoland, which of course would always be
21
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open to the British, would be a necessary key to such a plan. 22 Whereas Derby had been
willing to support such a proposal, Granville was not. He gruffly told Münster “I
suppose that the cession of Gibraltar would strengthen our good relations with Spain,”
but declined to express an opinion on such a controversial issue. Both sides thus agreed
that the matter should go no further – at least for the time being.23
In the meantime, the Anglo-German dispute over Angra Pequena in Africa was
reaching a boiling point. Accordingly, Bismarck ordered Münster to “cease to mention
the subject of Heligoland in your discussions…because of the excessive English claims
concerning Angra Pequena” and to focus instead on pursuing a favorable settlement
concerning Southwest Africa. 24 In a dispatch sent to Münster several days later,
Bismarck argued that “a desire of this kind can only be presented to a nation when it is in
friendly mood towards us. Our wishes regarding Heligoland rest on no legal basis and
would drag down our justified demands regarding overseas affairs to the same level, if
they were lumped together for public discussion.”25
Even though his first attempt at securing Helgoland had not borne fruit, Bismarck
remained undeterred. Four years later, in 1888, he again sought to pry the island away
from the British – in the process hoping to secure an alliance with Britain while settling
the Anglo-German colonial disputes in Africa, especially those in East Africa, once and
for all. Bismarck’s goal, as always, was the maintenance of good relations with Britain,
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if only to isolate France further. He would not allow colonial issues to stand in the way
of this objective.
While Kaiser Wilhelm I supported Bismarck’s actions, internal challenges arose
as a result of Wilhelm’s death in March 1888, the “Year of the Three Emperors.” The
new ruler, Wilhelm II, the impetuous son of Friedrich III and grandson of Wilhelm I,
ascended the throne and began to change radically the way the German government was
run, most importantly in regards to its foreign policy. Whereas Bismarck was largely
content to have Germany remain a European land power (Landmacht), Wilhelm dreamed
of his country becoming a world power (Weltmacht). Such a clash over foreign policy
made the relationship between Bismarck and Wilhelm very tense and lead to a number of
disputes between them. Despite their conflicts, Bismarck believed that Wilhelm did not
have to strength to oppose his wishes, and he showed scant respect for the Kaiser’s
policies in the late 1880s.26
Consequently, in 1889, Bismarck pressed on in his attempts to form an AngloGerman alliance. On 11 January, with the support of the German Chancellor, Count Max
von Berchem, the German under-secretary of state, asked Count Paul von Hatzfeldt,
Münster’s successor in London, to inquire about the possibility of an Anglo-German
alliance aimed against France. By joining with Germany, Britain would help ensure
peace throughout Europe and prevent any threats to British hegemony, particularly from
its age-old enemy, France. In a telegram sent to Hatzfeldt, Bismarck expressed the
importance of such a partnership:
26
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The surest way to obtain peace, which England and Germany equally desire,
or even the respite required by us for arming a view to the magnitude of coming
wars, will be the conclusion of a Treaty between England and Germany…. If a
secret Treaty of that kind were possible, both parties would obtain a considerable
promise of security against the result of such a war, whilst the avoidance of war
might be expected from its publication.27
On 16 January 1889 Hatzfeldt wrote back to the chancellor about his meeting with
Salisbury:
The Prime Minister realised at once the high political importance of the
suggestion which I introduced to him and saw in it a fresh and valuable
proof that Your Highness is striving for, and considers essential, a close bond
between the two Powers in the interest in European peace.28
Although the British Cabinet chose to delay any discussions until a more appropriate
time, a basis for further negotiations had been established.
In the early stages of his talks with Britain, Bismarck made no mention of
Helgoland, mainly because he considered the issue to be of minor importance at this time.
In fact, he originally had no intention of involving the island in his bid for a British
alliance: “if we take the initiative [concerning Helgoland], it would not only bring
difficulties into the Heligoland business, but it would also allow the Opposition in
England to describe the whole visit as a move intended to do harm to England.”29
Furthermore, Bismarck thought it would be best for London to initiate such an offer so
that Germans did not appear greedy.
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Nevertheless, in March 1889, Bismarck sent his son Herbert to London to broach
the Helgoland question with Salisbury. Regarding the desirability of an Anglo-German
accord, Herbert reported to his father that the British prime minister “entirely
agreed…that [an alliance] would be the best tonic for both countries and European
peace,” but that Salisbury, “considered it inopportune to act upon the suggestion [of an
alliance], since it would cause the Parliamentary majority [Lord Salisbury’s government]
to collapse.” Although Salisbury, and many others in the British government, were
receptive to Bismarck’s offer, they were hamstrung by the fact that the Conservative-led
British government depended on a coalition with the Liberal Unionists, who were ardent
imperialists and believed that Anglo-German colonial rivalries prevented any possibility
of an alliance. As a result, all Salisbury could do at the moment was to, “leave it [the
offer] on the table, without saying say yes or no,” although the prime minster hoped that
“he would live to see changed conditions, so that he might be able to give it practical
considerations.”30
Joseph Chamberlain, a leader within the Liberal Unionists and later colonial
secretary, was the first to suggest that Britain and Germany resolve their colonial
differences by exchanging Helgoland for colonial considerations in Africa. With this
proposal, the island now became entangled in colonial negotiations in 1889. In a letter to
his father, Herbert von Bismarck mentioned a conversation with Chamberlain in which
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the latter expressed that both sides “must make every effort to ‘remove all points from
which difficulties might arise between the two countries in the future.’”31
In early 1889, Germany began to encounter problems in German Southwest
Africa, as the Koikhoi, one of the native tribes, showed resistance to German rule.
Chamberlain saw the Reich’s problem as an opportunity for Britain and so he suggested
to the younger Bismarck that Germany cede this area to Britain. Although Herbert might
have agreed with him, he realized that Berlin “could not give it up, if only for the sake of
prestige because Angra Pequena had been the starting-point of our Colonial enterprises.”
Unfazed, Chamberlain persisted in trying to persuade him otherwise: “Naturally… we
cannot suggest your making a present of that Colony to England, however worthless it
may be—there must be compensation. What do you think if we gave you Heligoland
instead, which is useless for England and perhaps not worth having for you, were it but
for prestige?” Herbert found great satisfaction in this idea, believing that “the affair
would be advantageous to us and be immensely popular in Germany.” Recognizing the
governmental problems facing Salisbury in Parliament, however, the younger Bismarck
expressed that, “it was a pity that he, Chamberlain, was not at present a Minister, so that
we might make take his suggestion as referendum and clear the road for business.”
Regardless, Chamberlain assured him “the exchange would be popular in England and
would find an assured majority in Parliament. I shall defend it myself through thick and
thin in the House.” This impressed Herbert greatly, since such an agreement would
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“abolish all possible sources of dispute between [Britain and Germany]” and open the
door for an alliance between the two nations.32
Several weeks later, the topic of Chamberlain’s proposal surfaced in a
conversation between Count Hatzfeldt and Lord Salisbury. The ambassador then learned
that the British prime minister was not fully aware of the offer nor was he particularly
interested in the acquisition of German Southwest Africa. Salisbury added that he was
“quite unable to see what real advantage Heligoland would offer [Germany].” Hatzfeldt
agreed: “I have not yet formed any definite opinion whether the possession of
Heligoland would be a great and positive advantage to Germany. The only point which I
was clear was a negative political advantage, which, however must not be undervalued.”
Herbert himself appreciated Salisbury’s caution, writing, “it is in our best interest to leave
him plenty of time for examination and… wait a few weeks at least before returning to
the question with the Minister, and then only when a suitable opportunity offers.”33
At this time, the German chancellor also chose to take a cautious approach
towards Helgoland. Such a decision may have seemed surprising, since earlier he had
been so desirous of acquiring the island. In looking closer at the memoranda he wrote in
1889, however, his reasoning becomes clear: he had become fully aware of the
implications that such a deal could have if he tried to press forward with negotiations for
an Anglo-German alliance. If Berlin began such discussions, it would only complicate
the Helgoland question by opening the door for criticisms of German policy as being
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manipulative. Also, Bismarck’s prime concern, now, was the protection of the Reich’s
developing colonies which made him hesitant in negotiating with the British. Until his
position changed, matters concerning Helgoland, and a British alliance, would remain
closed.
Bismarck changed his line of thinking rather abruptly in August 1889 when he
appeared to grow tired of the constant squabbling between the British and Germans in
East Africa. He was concerned that the colonial circles in Germany were interfering far
too much in politics and needed to be restrained. Most importantly, however, he believed
that good relations with Britain were far more important than a piece of land several
thousands of kilometers away. As Felix Rachfahl remarks, “in his (Bismarck’s) last offer
of alliance, made in the year 1889, he managed the negotiations which led to the cession
of Helgoland, and he was disposed to exchange it for Southwest Africa.”34
What the final outcome of Bismarck’s shift in colonial policy would have been
remains uncertain. In February 1890 he began to return his focus to Europe, seeking to
minimize colonial issues and form some sort of a multi-power alliance with London.
With Bismarck’s declining concern for Germany’s overseas territories, the prospect of
exchanging a German colony in Africa for Helgoland was high. In any event, Bismarck
was unable to follow through with any substantive negotiations. In March 1890, the Iron
Chancellor, who had guided the Reich since unification in 1871, was forced from office.
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Chapter V
The Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty of 1890 and the German and British
Reactions
When Wilhelm II ascended the throne of the Germany in 1888, he began a radical
alteration of the administration of the German government, especially concerning its
foreign policy. 1 Not simply interested in Germany being the dominant power on the
European continent, Wilhelm dreamed of the German Empire becoming a major player in
world affairs, demanding, often in shrill and bellicose speeches, that the Reich be allowed
to find “its place in the sun.”2 In order to achieve this goal, he insisted upon making his
voice heard in every international crisis and acquiring colonial territory all over the
world, with little regard for potential conflict with other powers or how this might
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compromise Germany’s diplomatic position.3 In many instances, he chose to follow his
own plans regardless of whether they were in concert with the policies of his
chancellors.4 In March 1890, Bismarck fell victim to the new Kaiser’s desire to rule as
well as reign, and members of both the British and the German governments grew
increasingly anxious about the “new course” in German foreign and colonial policy.
The man Wilhelm chose to replace Bismarck was Georg Leo von Caprivi who
had been a member of the German armed forces serving as General of the Infantry and
state secretary of the Imperial Navy.5 Although Caprivi had little political experience,
and was loathe to accept appointment, the Kaiser was pragmatic in his selection.
Needing time to bring the state under his personal control, Wilhelm desired an
unambitious and deferential man to handle the day to day running of the government;
Caprivi fit this role perfectly.6 Caprivi’s administration of the government was markedly
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different from Bismarck’s. As Röhl states, Caprivi sought to “lead the nation back to an
everyday existence after the bygone epoch of great men and great events.”7 Although the
new chancellor tried to pursue moderate policies he thought would achieve this goal, he
also realized that the key to his chancellorship was his relationship with Wilhelm. At
first, he was able to satisfy the Kaiser’s demands, but friction between the two was
inevitable. As Baron Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, the state secretary for foreign
affairs, noted, the Kaiser, “interfere[d] persistently…. A monarch ought to have the last
word, but His Majesty wants to have the first, and this is a cardinal error.”8
The greatest conflict between the emperor and his new chancellor stemmed from
Caprivi's belief that Germany should not seek to become a world power. Consequently,
the German chancellor tried to maintain the Reich’s position in Europe by strengthening
Germany’s land forces while maintaining a limited defensive navy and seeking good
relations with England as the natural ally against Russia, the country that the Foreign
Office presumed threatened Germany’s position in Europe the most.9 Caprivi admitted,
however, that when it came to foreign policy, he felt, “as though he entered a dark
room.”10 Therefore, he maintained an open relationship with the members of the Foreign
Office and was guided in practical details by these men, led by Baron Friedrich von
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Holstein, the State Councilor (Geheimrat) in the Political Department. Although
appointed Geheimrat in 1876, Holstein did not exert any major influence on the direction
of German foreign policy until Bismarck’s dismissal in 1890. It was only then that he
came into his own, ultimately serving as the eminence grise of the German foreign office
between 1890 and 1906.11
While serving as an attaché to the royal Prussian Ministry in St. Petersburg in
1860, Holstein had developed a disdain for Russia that only intensified with time. As a
result, when the Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty, brokered by Bismarck in 1887, came
up for renewal in 1890, shortly after Bismarck’s departure, Holstein strongly urged
Caprivi to let the treaty expire.12 Not only did Holstein believe that the Austro-German
alliance would be undermined if Austria-Hungary learned of this secret agreement, but he
also surmised that it might drag Germany into a Russo-British war.13 Furthermore,
11
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Caprivi did not believe he could maintain the complicated alliance system that his
predecessor had designed, stating, “Bismarck was able to juggle with three balls (AustriaHungary, Italy and Russia). I can only juggle two.”14 Accordingly, the new chancellor
decided not to renew the Reinsurance Treaty, resulting in cold friendship between Berlin
and St. Petersburg. Ultimately, due to such poor Russo-German relations, a FrancoRussian entente, an unthinkable alignment a few years before, became a reality15 In the
words of Hans Dollinger, “Caprivi and his advisors expected the open hostility of Russia
in the foreseeable future, [they] consider these things unavoidable.”16 This in turn created
a sense in urgency for Berlin to settle Anglo-German differences and hopefully enter into
alliance with England.
Holstein believed in pursuing a cautious, but friendly, policy vis-à-vis London. He
did not want to provoke Whitehall by embracing an aggressive colonial agenda or an
extravagant increase in the size of the German Navy. The British public’s perception of
German policy, however, fostered the belief that the Kaiser would pursue an ambitious
policy in Africa. The Times reported on 21 March 1890, for example, that Wilhelm’s
statements had “forced [Salisbury] to give assurances to his own party that the
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government would give its full attention to African matters.”17 Two weeks later, another
article in The Times stated that Wilhelm II intended to indulge in schemes that would
secure all of East Africa for Germany at the expense of the British, “now that the
restraining hand of Prince Bismarck had been withdrawn.”18
It was concerns over colonial matters, particularly in East Africa, that had
motivated Lord Salisbury to attempt to settle disputes with Germany as early as 1889. He
worried that should another power take control of Uganda and the Upper Nile, Egypt’s
water supply, and thereby Britain’s Suez Canal route to India, could be threatened. In
June, his fears increased rapidly when he had learned that Karl Peters had crossed from
Zanzibar to Witu hoping to establish a line of German settlements from the Witu coast,
along the Tana River, to Victoria Nyanza and Buganda. Such a plan would, as Salisbury
suspected, give Germany a strong influence in the basin of the Upper Nile.19 As East
African disputes had continued to grow, it was clear that they needed to be settled,
otherwise trouble would erupt between Britain and Germany.20
Just prior to his dismissal in March 1890, Bismarck and Salisbury agreed to
discuss a settlement of colonial matters. As part of the talks, Britain and German would
use arbitration to resolve the questions concerning all of Africa and not just Zanzibar and
East Africa. As a result, Salisbury prepared to dispatch Sir Percy Anderson of the British
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Colonial Department to Berlin.21 The change in the German government, however,
delayed Anderson’s departure and he did not arrive until May, when the increasing
concerns over East Africa reached their peak.
In April 1890, before he had left for Berlin, Anderson met with Count Hatzfeldt to
clarify the respective positions of their governments in advance of any official meetings.
Towards the end of April, Hatzfeldt wrote to Caprivi that talks were progressing well.
Hatzfeldt reported that, during their conversations, Anderson “greatly emphasized the
difficulties at Zanzibar and the necessity of forestalling future differences by another
demarcation of frontiers.… [and] indicated clearly that the fact of Witu being in
[German] hands was the chief stumbling-block and the reason for British mistrust.”22 It
became clear to the German ambassador that should this problem be settled, the rest of
the disputes in East Africa could be resolved with ease.
Anderson finally reached Berlin on 3 May and he began negotiations on 5 May
with Dr. Richard Krauel, the head of the Colonial Department in the German Foreign
Office. The talks started off positively and the question of arbitration receded into the
background. The only difficulty that remained was the demarcation of the boundary in
the lakes region in East Africa.23 London desired the land between the Lake Victoria
Nyanze and Lake Tanganyika for the Stevenson Road, which would connect Britain’s
northern and southern possessions around the lakes, whereas the Germans wanted the
21
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same territory in order to control the east-west trade in this region. Several days later,
Anderson reported that he had been able to secure some concessions from the Germans,
but that talks were becoming quite heated. While willing to give Britain control of the
north side of Victoria Nyanza, Berlin refused to yield its claims to the south.24 As a
result, Anderson and Krauel had reached an impasse. Both sides, however, agreed to let
Salisbury and Hatzfeldt try to sort things out in London before resuming negotiations.
Salisbury and Hatzfeldt met on 13 May and held the first of several discussions on
East Africa. The prime minister began by informing the German ambassador that,
although the German claims to the lakes region was based on the “Hinterland Theory,”
such a premise was not “recognised here, [and] had not been accepted in International
Law.” Moreover, it could “not possibly apply to territory which had been controlled by
Englishmen, and where British interests had existed long before.” 25 While Hatzfeldt
understood this point, he also reminded Salisbury that, “a compromise on colonial
questions was necessary for various reasons in the interests of both sides, in order to
prevent further friction” and while Germany “could not renounce the whole of the
territory under dispute… at least a partition of the object of contention would be
advisable.”26
At this point, the conversations between the two seemed to have reached a dead
end. After some hesitation, however, Salisbury decided to re-examine the differences in
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East Africa between Germany and Great Britain in order to forge an agreement that might
satisfy the wishes of both parties.27 The German ambassador readily welcomed this offer,
but then listened with dismay as the prime minister revealed a formidable list of demands
that included German recognition of Buganda as part of Britain’s sphere of influence, and
the surrender of Germany’s protectorate over Witu and the islands off its coast, Manda
and Patta. Salisbury also revealed another heretofore-unknown objective: the
establishment of a British protectorate over Zanzibar to replace the earlier three-power
protection of the island.28 In return, he agreed to partition the region around Lake
Victoria Nyanza and establish the German frontier at a line running between Victoria
Nyanza and Lake Tankganyika, while promising to use British influence to persuade the
Sultan of Zanzibar to sell outright the coastal leases to Germany.29
Then, without any warning, Salisbury placed Helgoland on the table, informing
Hatzfeldt that the British government would be willing to “hand over the island of
Heligoland to Germany.”30 Hatzfeldt and the German government were completely
caught off guard. They wondered when Salisbury had arrived at this decision and
whether anyone else had prior knowledge of it. According to Salisbury’s daughter, Lady
Gwendolyn Cecil, it appeared that her father still hoped for a rapprochement with
Germany and that as early as 10 April he considered Helgoland an important part to this.
“But rarely,” she wrote, “can a political enterprise of equal importance have left behind
27
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so few traces of the process of incubation.”31 On 18 April, Salisbury had returned to
London from a convalescence at Beaulieu and “with a brain cleared from the last
lingering mists of influenza,” he was able to reassess the East African situation. 32
Perhaps it was then that he decided to offer Helgoland to the Germans. Political
considerations may have been a factor, too. At this time, the famous explorer Henry
Stanley was busily making “rabble-rousing speeches at huge open meetings… at which
he condemned what he called British subservience to Germany in East Africa.”33 The
fact that Salisbury served as both prime minister and foreign secretary, however, meant
that decisions were shaped within his own mind with no need for the exchange of
information or ideas between the two offices. The only thing that can be said for certain
is that during April 1890 Salisbury decided to make Helgoland a part of the African
negotiations.
Regardless of his reasons, Salisbury was keenly aware that such an offer would
have huge ramifications for the ongoing negotiations between Germany and Britain. As a
result, he begged Hatzfeldt, “to report to Berlin nothing of what he had said” because the
transfer of Helgoland would first need the approval of Parliament, whose support he was
not completely certain he had. 34
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Berlin initially responded with indignation to Salisbury’s proposition. Marschall,
the German state secretary for foreign affairs, surmised that the demands for concessions
“around Lake Tanganyika would prevent German contact with the Belgian Congo” and
would give the British control of East-West trade routes. He insisted that the northern
border must be 1˚ south latitude while the southern should be the Rovuma River, giving
the Germans access to Lake Nyasa. It was only on these conditions that a partition could
be worked out in conjunction with a surrender of Witu, Manda and Patta.35 In regards to
Salisbury’s more extensive proposals in West Africa, however, Marschall instructed
Hatzfeldt “not a priori [to] adopt an attitude of refusal.”36
Within a week, Salisbury appeared to make an about face and Hatzfeldt reported
that the situation had become “much complicated by Stanley’s hostile and inflammatory
attacks.” Hatzfeldt further informed Marschall that “Lord Salisbury is inclined to
consider it advisable to postpone our negotiations until the excitement is allayed.”37 The
German ambassador believed, however, that “if Germany held her nerve ‘even more
might be obtained’ from Britain after further negotiations.”38
Nevertheless, a sense of urgency settled in the German Foreign Office on the next
day: “Postponement of negotiations most undesirable,” Marschall believed, “and would
be most unwelcomed because of the influence it would have upon opinion [in Germany]
and on account of the danger that further differences were likely to arise through
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expeditions into the interior of Africa.” The Wilhelmstrasse saw its opportunity to
acquire Helgoland slipping through its fingers, and so Marschall made a surprising move:
almost total capitulation:
I inform you that we are ready to make the concessions and probable further
ones mentioned in your telegram, to hand over to England, Witu and Somali
Coast with their respective hinterlands, and to concede a British Protectorate
over Zanzibar, if England will hand over Helgoland and support us in demanding
from the Sultan of Zanzibar the cession of the coast of the mainland.39
On 25 May, he made it clear to Hatzfeldt that “the possession of Helgoland is highly
important for military reasons because of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, and the possession
of the coastal strip leased to us by the Sultan is indispensable for the definite regulation of
our position in East Africa.” Consequently, Berlin was “ready for an immediate
agreement on this basis,” but if London failed to agree, “we [Germany] should have to
insist on the straight line in the North from the mouth of the Kagera to the Congo State
and on the partitioning of the disputed territory in the South, and we could only discuss
relinquishing Witu, etc., if we are granted greater concessions in the South, than those
offered.”40
Concurrently, the negotiations concerning Africa came up for debate in the British
Parliament. Many in the House of Commons expressed support for Salisbury’s resistance
to German pressure for concessions, especially concerning Zanzibar and British East
Africa. Ronald Munro Ferguson, MP for Leith Burghs, urged the government not to
abandon interest in the Stevenson Road, while another MP, James Maclean, suggested
39
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that the negotiations remain suspended until the government could discern the national
feeling on the African issues.41 Still, even though Salisbury’s proposal was being
discussed in London and Berlin, the talks on Africa remained stalled.
On 27 May, negotiations began anew. Salisbury informed Hatzfeldt that the
previously mentioned terms were acceptable, but that he wished to secure the approval of
two entities whose interests were at stake, the Imperial British East Africa Company and
the Scottish Missionary Society, before talks could proceed. Such a move upset the
German Foreign Office as it meant more delays. Moreover, it was feared these two
groups might pressure Salisbury for more German concessions.
In a secret telegram sent on 29 May, Marschall emphasized that “the possession
of Helgoland is of supreme importance to us and is by far the most serious matter in the
whole negotiation. His Majesty shares the Chancellor’s opinion that without Helgoland
the Kiel Canal is useless to our Navy.” Indeed, the acquisition of Helgoland was viewed
“as a gain in itself even as against the concessions mentioned.” Marschall also instructed
the ambassador to argue that “so good an opportunity will scarcely occur twice for
settling two questions so threatening to Anglo-German relations… in a way which will
give so little cause of complaint…either in England or Germany.”42
On the following day Hatzfeldt reassured Marschall that he never forgot the
“importance of Helgoland,” but thought that it was not wise to indicate “its true
importance too soon to Lord Salisbury.” If Berlin did, “there would then be no further
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concessions to be obtained in the colonies, and we should be obliged to grant all colonial
demands, in order to gain the island.” Even though Berlin was prepared to give into all
Salisbury’s demands, the prime minister still delayed, indicating to Hatzfeldt that he
needed “to discuss it with his colleagues, some of whom were nervous on the point on
account of Parliament and public opinion,” although he himself “did not share this
view.”43 Salisbury’s tactics caused great anxiety in the Wilhelmstrasse and helped him
secure concessions he most likely could not have won had Bismarck still been in power.
On 30 May, Marschall wrote Hatzfeldt, “His Majesty… is in full agreement with
your tactics regarding Heligoland,” and ordered the ambassador to try to hold the line
regarding German claims in the north of East Africa. At most, he was authorized to
relinquish territory around the southern boundary and adjust the northern boundary, as
outlined in the telegram from 29 May. Marschall, however, cautioned Hatzfeldt that, “if,
in spite of our renunciation in the South, this is not obtainable… and if the conclusion of
the agreement depends exclusively on this question, you will please ask for further
instructions by telegraph.” Evidently, the members of the Wilhelmstrasse were pushed to
the limit of their concessions and doubt was increasing as to whether or not a deal could
be made if Britain demanded more. Furthermore, Germany considered threatening the
British prime minister if he continued to delay their talks: “If Lord Salisbury refers again
to a postponement of the negotiations, please remind him that Dr. Peters will arrive on
the coast by the end of June, and that, taking into consideration his character and
antecedents, it is certainly expected that in pushing the treaties concluded by him, he will
43
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arouse our public opinion against England, just as Stanley has done in England against
Germany.”44
Marschall’s desire for a quick settlement remained elusive and many in the
German government were becoming frantic, none more than Wilhelm, as evidenced by
his marginalia scribbled on a telegram he received from Marschall on 4 June:
At yesterday’s conference between Count Hatzfeldt and Lord Salisbury the
latter declared that he had found much anxiety amongst his colleagues concerning
these concessions (Kaiser: !) and suggested that it would be better to postpone
further this and the connected question of the Protectorate over Zanzibar
(Kaiser: No! All or nothing!) and leave it for a later agreement (Kaiser: No!)45
On the same day that Marschall wrote Wilhelm regarding the negotiations, the
German foreign secretary also sent another telegram to Hatzfeldt with instructions that he
hoped would assuage Salisbury’s doubts in proceeding with the negotiations. He wrote
that the Wilhelmstrasse was willing to concede territory for the Stevenson Road, and
agree to freedom of trade, settlement and religion in East Africa. In order to accept the
British demands in the lakes region, however, the coastal territory, including the islands
of Manda and Patta, must become a German possession. In agreeing to these terms,
Marschall wanted Hatzfeldt to make it clear to Salisbury that “the main success of such
an agreement will consist in the assurance to both parties that unsettled colonial
differences will not give rise to disagreements, likely in incalculable ways to disturb the
continuity of European policy.”46 The German foreign minister hoped that this plan
would force the British prime minister into a corner, since his seeming inability to reach
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an agreement with Germany would make it appear that he had no desire to be involved in
European affairs.
In the beginning of June, Salisbury arranged for a debate in Parliament by which
he hoped to gauge sentiment regarding the cession of Helgoland. Sir George Campbell, a
particularly vocal MP for Kirkcaldy Burghs, argued that no reason existed to retain a
“summer bathing spa” for a few Germans at the government’s expense. In the end,
however, Parliament was divided, agreeing only that a “very hard bargain” should be
driven for Helgoland.47 Complicating Salisbury’s task even was the fact that members of
his own cabinet did not fully support the proposal. They contended that Britain was
giving up too much and criticized the use of European territory as a bargaining chip for
gains in Africa.48
Helgoland’s fate was also widely discussed in the British press. The Times
carried several articles speculating on the negotiations between Germany and Britain,
most of them critical of German colonialism while extolling the virtues of the British rule
in Africa. Their focal point, and the sense of public opinion, seemed to be that the
government should do what was necessary in order to secure the Stevenson Road. The
achievement of this goal would justify signing a treaty with Berlin.49
Finally, on 5 June, Hatzfeldt reported that Lord Salisbury, after further discussion
with his colleagues, would “communicate… the British government’s final decision on
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the scheme,” on 14 June. 50 With a firm deadline now in sight, Marschall telegraphed
“the German Government’s agreement with the scheme described.” In a strange twist,
however, the message ended with a threat to the British. “His Majesty [the Kaiser]
regards the scheme as a whole as the utmost we can concede. He has stated his decision
that if Britain fails to accept it, as presented to you to Lord Salisbury, further negotiations
must be renounced, and thereafter nothing but the effective possession of the disputed
territory can decide the question.”51 The mood in the German Foreign Office had
changed from one of anxiety and uncertainty to one of ardent determination.
Salisbury, however, still needed approval for the draft of the agreement before he
could present it to Germany. Gaining such support was a complicated affair for the prime
minister, as winning consent from Parliament, his cabinet, the public, and even the Queen
would not be an easy undertaking. The cabinet was still clearly divided over
surrendering Helgoland, as several members continued to see the island as a potentially
valuable naval base. On 7 June, after a series of particularly lengthy and heated
discussions, Salisbury agreed to appoint a special ad hoc Cabinet Committee to undertake
a “careful sifting” of the Helgoland question. The pivotal members of this committee
were Lord Salisbury; George Goschen, the chancellor of the exchequer; W. H. Smith, the
leader of the House of Commons; Arthur Balfour, the chief secretary for Ireland; Edward
Stanhope, the secretary of war; and Lord George Hamilton, the first lord of the admiralty.
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These men met on 10 June, when they learned from the Admiralty that this “untenable
advanced base” was valueless to Britain.52
The Queen herself was fiercely opposed to relinquishing Helgoland to the
Germans. Such dissent was a significant roadblock to Salisbury. The island had a quiet
affection for Victoria since 1863 when the inhabitants had sent the Prince of Wales,
Albert Edward, their best wishes on his engagement, and received him kindly when he
visited Helgoland in 1886. Three years later, when she learned that the Governor of
Helgoland had asked the Treasury to supply a portrait of the Queen for Government
House, Victoria quietly ordered one to be sent at her own expense.
Unlike Wilhelm, Victoria did not voice her opinions while Britain and Germany
were conducting their negotiations over Africa. As a result, Salisbury was remarkably
slow in informing the Queen about the talks and particularly the relevance of Helgoland.
The first real inkling she had of the island’s role in the discussions came on 4 June when
she was speaking to Lord Richard Assheton Cross, the secretary of state for India.
According to her journal they “talked of Africa and what we required, which he showed
me on the map. Germany wants more; he said there was the idea of giving up Heligoland
as an equivalent, it being no use to us; but this has not been brought forward yet.”53 This
is quite surprising since the preliminary agreement in which Helgoland would be ceded
was concluded only one day later.
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The next communication Victoria received on the subject came on 8 June. Upon
hearing the Cabinet, broadly satisfied with the settlement, had moved to discuss the
surrender of Helgoland, the incensed Queen sent Salisbury a blistering telegram:
Having received your account of the Cabinet. Understood from Lord Cross that
nothing was to be done about Heligoland, and now hear it is to be decided
tomorrow. It is a very serious question which I do not like.
1st. The people have always been very loyal, having received my heir
with enthusiasm; and it is a shame to hand them over to an unscrupulous despotic
Government like the German without first consulting them.
2nd. It is very bad precedent. The next thing will be to propose to give up
Gibraltar; and soon nothing will be secure, and all our colonies will wish to be
free.
I very much deprecate it and am anxious not to give my consent unless I
hear that the people’s feelings are consulted and their rights are respected. I
think it is a very dangerous proceeding.54
At the Cabinet meeting on 10 June, the Queen’s telegram was duly read to the
assembled ministers, giving hope to those members uneasy about surrendering the island
that Britain might still retain it. Salisbury, on the other hand, was quite alarmed,
believing Victoria was likely to reject the proposals if he could not allay her fears.
Therefore, the prime minister skillfully composed a letter to the queen in which he
summarized the decisions made about the Helgolanders and the wider implications of the
Helgoland swap in relations to Britain’s position in Africa. He also assured her that,
“[the Cabinet] is of the opinion that in any agreement arrived at with Germany the rights
of the people of Heligoland should be carefully reserved…. No subject of your Majesty
living now will be subject to naval or military conscription. The existing customs tariff
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will be maintained for a period of years and every person wishing to retain his British
nationality will have the right to do so.”55
Salisbury sidestepped the crucial issue of the wishes of the Helgolanders.
Claiming that it was impracticable to obtain the formal consent of the 2,000 people who
lived there, he explained that, “the information available to the Cabinet is that the
population, which is not British but Frisian, would readily come under the German
Empire if protected from conscription.” Consequently, Salisbury ended his message, “on
these grounds the Cabinet unanimously recommend the arrangement for Your Majesty’s
sanction.”56
It was in this way that the prime minister was able to convince the Queen that
there was “now no effective constitutional means by which she could impede the process
of the Heligoland swap.”57 On 11 June, Victoria reluctantly replied, “Your cipher about
Heligoland received. The conditions you enumerate are sound and the alliance of
Germany is valuable; but that any of my possessions should be thus bartered away causes
me great uneasiness, and I can only consent on receiving a positive assurance from you
that the present arrangement constitutes no precedent.”58 Salisbury assured her that the
relinquishing of Helgoland would not become an example for the future. Satisfied by his
response, Victoria dispatched her final telegram concerning the negotiations the next day:
“Your answer respecting Heligoland forming no possible precedent I consider
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satisfactory. I sanction the proposed cession or almost exchange. But I must repeat that I
think you may find great difficulties in the future. Giving up what one has is always a
bad thing.”59 Victoria’s unease never disappeared, but, with her consent secured,
Salisbury had avoided a major roadblock to cession of Helgoland.
Finally, on 14 June, with the consent of the Queen and the Cabinet, Salisbury
presented the German government with the final draft of the settlement that addressed all
outstanding disputes in Africa which London and Berlin had discussed in the preceding
weeks. In West Africa, the border between Togoland and the British Gold Coast was
adjusted, as well as Kamerun’s western boundary. The border between German
Southwest Africa and British Bechuanaland was also delimited, with Germany gaining
access to the Zambesi River.60 In East Africa, new boundaries were also defined. In the
north, Germany ceded all claims to Witu and the Somaliland coast. The immense region
from the coast of Somaliland to the Congo was to be divided between the contracting
parties. Britain received the territory laying north of a line from the River Umba across
Lake Victoria to the frontier of the Congo Free State and Berlin the land to the south.
Germany also recognized a British protectorate over Zanzibar and Pemba in exchange for
Britain persuading the Sultan of Zanzibar to give his coastal territory in East Africa to
Germany. Last, but not least, the island of Helgoland was given to the Germans. The
German government found these terms acceptable and was thus willing to sign an official
treaty.
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One week later, on 18 June, Sir Percy Anderson and Count Hatzfeldt met in
Berlin and initialed a preliminary agreement on Africa and Helgoland. With the major
obstacles now cleared, the focus shifted to areas outside of East Africa and on the
specifics of Helgoland’s transfer.
In accordance with the Queen’s wishes, Salisbury requested that the agreement
include assurances for the rights of the people of Helgoland and that Germany grant
privileges to the British subjects on the island that would safeguard their private interests,
including the right to fish its waters. He also asked that the Helgolanders be exempted
from military conscription once the exchange occurred and to allow the people to choose
whether they would remain British or become German. Berlin readily accepted these
terms, and a final draft on the agreement was written fairly quickly. On 28 June, Caprivi
approved the draft and Salisbury followed two days later. The document was officially
signed on 1 July. Still, both Caprivi and Salisbury faced an uphill battle as they tried to
win support from members of their respective parliaments and the public.
In Germany, many individuals at the Wilhelmstrasse were pleased that an
agreement had finally been reached. The Kaiser himself was satisfied the discussions had
ended well and especially with the acquirement of Helgoland.61 He joyfully declared in a
speech, “it is with satisfaction that I receive Heligoland into the fringe of the German
islands which skirt the Fatherland.” Now, the military and domestic importance could be
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realized as “the island is destined to be a bulwark in the sea, a protection to German
fishermen, a port of supply for my warships, and a place of refuge and protection in the
German Ocean against all enemies who may venture to show themselves upon it.”62
Not everyone in Germany, however, shared the Kaiser’s enthusiasm. Dr. Karl
Peters was very vocal in his criticism of the Anglo-German agreement. He was in East
Africa trying to gain more territory for Germany when news of the Helgoland-Zanzibar
settlement reached him. He complained rather bitterly that, “the two kingdoms, Witu and
Buganda, had been sacrificed for a bathtub in the North Sea.”63 It was his dream to see
Germany control a vast empire in Africa and seeing this dashed for a small island in the
North Sea was disheartening. Indeed, as a result of Peter’s opposition, the Pan-German
League (Alldeutscher Verband) was founded. This organization was very vocal in its
protests and even wrote several pamphlets against the acquisition of Helgoland and the
relinquishing of Zanzibar to the British.
There were also objections within the German government. One of the primary
opponents was Gustav Michahelles, the German Consul General in Zanzibar. When he
learned of the loss of Zanzibar, he was shocked, remarking that, “when Vice-Consul von
Buri broke the decoding of the dispatch to me pale with fright… [that] Zanzibar was to be
ceded to England, I again sent him into the chancellery with the instruction [that] the
dispatch must be garbled,” and that the message meant to “name Witu instead of
Zanzibar.” There was no mistake in the message, however. Zanzibar, along with Witu,
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was to be exchanged for Helgoland. Although he never openly expressed his displeasure,
the fact that he believed “the value of the Zanzibar Treaty and the exchange of Zanzibar
for Helgoland… do not need to be discussed,” indicates that Michahelles was not happy.
Part of his discontent stemmed from the fact that through such a settlement, “our colonial
work is essentially made heavier,” mainly because he questioned what person “would
like to risk [their] health and wealth securing colonial territory, when the government
only used the Colonies from the point of view of an item exchange.”64
The German consul general was not the only one surprised at the announcement
of the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty. A few days after Michahelles received the message
concerning the swap of islands, several British Marine Officers approached the German
consul and asked if he “would like to speak to them openly [as to] whether Zanzibar
should truly fall under an English Protectorate.” They “were not able to imagine, that we
wanted to give up something, which we would properly already have in [our]
possession.”65
Meanwhile, Caprivi was faced with defending the Helgoland-Zanzibar agreement
in the Reichstag, whose feelings about the treaty were also quite mixed. While many
delegates were eager to acquire Helgoland for the Reich, they considered the price to be
paid too high. Furthermore, some argued that Germany was offering a level of friendship
which the British never reciprocated. To members of the opposition, Caprivi responded
that the value of Helgoland was being largely underestimated and that Germany had more
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than enough territory overseas that it could develop. Nonetheless, such attacks did not
cease and the chancellor was forced to defend the treaty well into 1891, long after the
agreement became official.
Initially, much of the German press favored the treaty. The Schlesische Zeitung,
for example, argued that with the island under German control, the danger of an enemy
landing on the coast was “greatly reduced, because thereupon the hostile transport fleet
would choose the staging area in the open sea, [and] potentially must attempt the landing
under unfavorable conditions,” giving Germany an upper hand defending its territory.66
By the end of June, however, the press, especially the conservative newspapers, became
highly critical of the treaty. The Vossische Zeitung, for example, argued that “while
Helgoland was a great gain for Germany, it was slender compensation for the losses in
Africa” and that Germany had been tricked out of Zanzibar. 67 The Hamburger
Nachrichten wrote that the government “had conceded everything to England,” while the
Reichsbote remarked that Britain only “talks of friendship, when she wishes to exact
sacrifices.”68 Indeed, prior to 1890 the conservative German press had generally
supported Bismarck and his policies. It seems, then, that disfavor they expressed
regarding the treaty in some way represented Bismarck’s own displeasure.69 They
became even more hostile after the former chancellor published a letter critical of the
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negotiations and argued that the German government had made a poor and ultimately
unsuccessful attempt to win British friendship.70
On 28 July, however, Caprivi officially defended the treaty in a lengthy
memorandum to the Reichstag. He argued that where concessions had been made, as in
the case of Zanzibar, Great Britain “has been acting there since the beginning of the
century, and… had a stronger presence”71 and that, “Helgoland…was generally
considered quite valuable… for our defense of our North Sea coast.”72 In the end, he
concluded that, “the treaty for us was favorable” and convinced enough members of the
Reichstag to agree to the treaty and its provisions.73
For Salisbury, winning support of the treaty proved more difficult. As in
Germany, public opinion was mixed, and the debate that had already taken place over
Helgoland ensured strong opposition. If the prime minister wanted the treaty to be
ratified by Parliament, he was going to have to win the support of the opposition.
When the news broke that Britain was intending to surrender Helgoland, many
British newspapers and journals, which took a sudden interest in the island, opposed
Salisbury. Journalists flocked to Helgoland. One illustrated paper, the Leisure Hour, ran
a dispatch that described it as a land “where there are no bankers, no lawyers, and no
crime; where all gratuities are strictly forbidden, the landladies are honest and the
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boatmen take no tips.”74 The English Illustrated Magazine also spoke of Helgoland in
glowing terms: “No one should go there who cannot be content with the charms of
brilliant light, of ever-changing atmospheric effects, of a land free from the countless
discomforts and busy population, and of air which tastes like draughts of life itself.”75
Due to such positive descriptions, Britons who had not even heard of Helgoland
before suddenly were fascinated by it and did not wish to see it ceded. Articles appeared
that denounced Salisbury and the treaty. On 18 June, a lengthy letter to the editor
appeared in The Times criticizing the prime minister’s treatment of the Helgolanders,
stating that the people had “no desire to be bartered away.”76 The following day, The
Times ran an article from a foreign correspondent which criticized Salisbury for pushing
his desire to oblige the Germans to the limit.77 The Standard predicted that the prime
minister’s government would not survive the negative public reaction and that the prime
minister should step down. 78
The supporters of the treaty, however, quickly responded with their own press
campaign. Several letters and editorials appeared in The Times explaining the advantages
of the treaty. The Manchester Guardian hoped that the Anglo-German agreement would
be accepted in both countries as a final settlement,79 while the Morning Post thought a
“good understanding could be established between England and her natural ally,” and
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that “the price Germany has agreed for Heligoland” justified the deal. 80 Ultimately, this
campaign successfully quieted the opposition in the press.
Salisbury still faced an intense battle from Parliament, however. Although the
Wilhelmstrasse and Whitehall had accepted the terms of the treaty, the British Parliament
still had to approve the surrender of Helgoland before the agreement could go into effect.
On 24 June, Howard Vincent wrote to The Times, “I have no intention of voting for the
hauling down of the British flag upon any portion of the globe unless personally
convinced that the Empire gains more than it loses.”81 The Review of Reviews also noted
that the refusal to listen to the protests of the people “reminds one of the transactions
between the Russian grandees of olden times, when, to pay a gambling debt, an estate
with all its serfs would be made over from one noble proprietor to another.”82
Despite these objections, Salisbury submitted the bill for cession of the island on
3 July. On the following day, the prime minister’s opponents raised several issues, some
of which he had anticipated, and some which were unexpected. Earl De La Warr
criticized the government for presuming that the islanders could be guaranteed the rights
and privileges they enjoyed as British subjects and argued that the prime minister
abandoned the island’s inhabitants by not limiting Germany’s authority over them.
Salisbury responded that, “it would be impossible to include in any treaty a delimitation
of the rights of the Heligolanders,” but that everything possible had been done to “protect
the British subjects by allowing them to retain their British citizenship” and by having
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Berlin pledge to preserve Helgoland’s laws and customs, just as Britain had done when it
first took over the island in 1815.83
The debate in the House of Commons also raised the matter of Helgoland’s value
to Britain’s security. Francis Channing, a Liberal Party member and another opponent to
the agreement, repeatedly urged the release of any reports made by the Admiralty or War
Office concerning the island, arguing that a proper decision could not be made without
them. The government, however, refused which caused some to wonder if the cession of
Helgoland would harm Britain’s North Sea defenses. The First Lord of the Treasury, W.
H. Smith, however, defended Salisbury’s position, stating that such information could
“not be conveniently published,” but a correct assessment of the island’s value could be
drawn from the fact that, “no government since 1821 had armed or garrisoned” it.84
On 10 July, Salisbury, encouraged by members of his Cabinet, defended the treaty
during its second reading in the House of Lords. Knowing that he needed to find a way
to convince members of the opposition to support him, the prime minister spent many
hours beforehand preparing for the debate. He tried to strengthen his position by
claiming that the islanders’ “pecuniary interests comes down to motives less noble to
dwell upon,” implying that the people had once earned money by deliberately wrecking
ships. As for the strategic position of the island, he argued that there existed no harbor,
but rather “an open roadstead, which is untenable in a north-west wind, which is the
prevailing wind. He also insisted that, “in respect to war with Germany… it would
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expose us to a blow which would be a considerable humiliation; and it would not confer
upon us any great advantage in the conduct of war.”85 Since the MPs had little
knowledge about Helgoland, he also did not reveal its primary value to the British: that
Britain’s possession of the island prevented others from having it.
What Salisbury failed to mention in his defense, and where he was the most
vulnerable to attack, was the wishes of the islanders. The leader of the opposition,
Archibald Primrose, Lord Rosebery, however, did not allow Salisbury to skirt this issue.
Rosebery asked, if an island population of 2,000 was an acceptable threshold for the
transfer of sovereignty, “why not hand over a few of the smaller Channel Islands?” He
also observed that, “we have as yet failed to find out exactly how the noble Marquis
arrived at the conclusion which he confided in us,” namely that the islanders wished to
become German citizens. Salisbury attempted to defend himself by claiming, “the
manner in which I have arrived at the impressions I have stated, I am compelled to treat
as confidential,” but such a statement did little to help his cause. 86
A final challenge to the Helgoland Bill came just as the government was set to
vote on it. Francis Channing pointed out that the colonial governments had not been
consulted during the negotiation process, and condemned the government for ignoring
their interests. In response, Salisbury stated that the colonial administrations had been
allowed to express their views on matters affecting their interests when possible. The
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point at which to do that, however, had passed and now it was up to the home
government to decide what had to be done.
After much debate, the Helgoland Bill went to a vote on 31 July. Even though he
faced considerable vocal opposition in the House of Commons, in the end, Salisbury
prevailed by a vote of 209 to 61. After securing such a large majority of support in the
Commons, the bill easily passed through the House of Lords with little opposition. The
prime minister succeeded because few MPs knew much about Helgoland itself and
because the main opponents to the bill such as Channing, Howard Vincent and William
Summers, were unknown and lightly regarded backbenchers. On 4 August 1890, the bill
became law, making the Helgoland-Zanzibar treaty official. Six days later, Wilhelm II
travelled to Helgoland to preside over the transfer of the island to Germany.
Both sides congratulated themselves on a job well done in crafting an agreement
that benefitted both nations. Britain’s colonial interests had been secured, and Germany
had attained the elusive goal of acquiring Helgoland. More importantly, the treaty was
hailed as the beginning of a new era in Anglo-German relations. With the two nations
finally reaching a colonial agreement, a large obstacle that had long prevented a stronger
bond between the two powers had been removed. Even though London and Berlin
seemed destined to become closer allies, however, the opposite occurred. Instead, Britain
and Germany grew further and further apart during the beginning of the twentieth
century, ultimately opposing each other in World War I.

Chapter VI
Conclusion – Results of the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty and the Path to War
The signing of the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty in 1890 marked a high point in
Anglo-German relations. Until the early twentieth century, very few British or German
statesmen really thought that the two countries would ever go to war with one another. In
fact, during the 1880s, Bismarck himself frequently argued that the two powers were
natural allies, and he tried to bring the two together. With the passage of time, however,
relations grew worse rather than better. While it certainly is an overstatement to suggest
that the conclusion of the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty led to Great Britain and Germany
opposing one another in the First World War, one can nonetheless argue that the treaty
was one of many stepping stones on the path to armed conflict.
Prior to the signing of the agreement, Bismarck had generally used the German
colonies as pawns in his diplomatic chess matches with Britain. He had little interest in
expanding German territory in East Africa and was willing to cede some of it if it would
lead to either a permanent Anglo-German understanding or possibly joining the Triple
Alliance. For Bismarck, East Africa was “admirably suited to become the sacrificial ram
on the altar of friendship.”1 Nonetheless, with the ending of their colonial rivalry in
Africa in 1890, Britain and Germany were able to pursue their interests independently of
one another. The treaty had defined their areas of control in Africa so well that the need
for intensive collaboration melted away.
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Furthermore, Germany was now deprived of an important bargaining chip with
Britain and was no longer in a position where it once held the balance of power. With the
conclusion of the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty, the path was paved for London to reach
colonial settlements with other countries. France, for example, was essentially forced to
conclude an agreement, lest it allow a rapprochement between Germany, the country with
the most powerful army, and Britain, the country with the most powerful navy. Such an
arrangement between these two “natural” rivals demonstrated that Paris and London
could reach an understanding with each other and the door was now open, albeit slightly,
for them to reach further agreements in the future, such as the Entente Cordiale in 1904.
These settlements also allowed the British to continue to remain isolated now that its
rivals no longer had any real grounds for quarrelling.
On the other hand, the treaty placed Germany in a position where it had to rely
more on Britain than Britain had to rely on Germany. Berlin and Paris were not ready to
reach a rapprochement so soon after the Franco-Prussian war. Consequently, France still
loomed as a threat to German security in Europe and elsewhere. At the same time, in
1890, Caprivi and other members of the government chose not to renew the Reinsurance
Treaty with Russia, thus creating a new enemy and forcing Germany to depend on British
help in order to prevent Paris and St. Petersburg from opposing its wishes and
overrunning the Reich. By 1904, when Britain and France signed their entente, Berlin
could no longer play the game of offering to join Paris in a common hostility towards
London, nor could it demonstrate its superior ability to return to good relations with
Britain, now that it had reached a rapprochement with France.
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This alone did not prevent Britain and Germany from drawing closer together, but
with the latter’s foreign policy rapidly changing in the late 1890s, a growing alienation
between the two powers was only natural. Berlin no longer wanted to be in the shadow
of London and so it embarked on a path which would allow it to rise up and challenge the
greatest empire in the world. Wilhelm believed that his country deserved its own “place
in the sun” and that it was the equal of Britain in world politics. He thought that the best
way to achieve this was through the construction of a navy that would allow Germany to
increase its colonial possessions and be better able to protect them. This became the
hallmark of German foreign policy after 1890. Even though a large part of East Africa
was lost in 1890, Berlin still had designs on increasing its territory elsewhere in the
world.2 Furthermore, with the acquisition of Helgoland, Germany not only gained an
installation with which it could protect the fleet that it was constructing at
Wilhelmshaven, but also a base of operations on the North Sea.
Helgoland was located strategically off the German coast, allowing easy access to
both the North Sea and the newly built Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. With the island in their
possession, members of the German government surmised that there would be few
challenges to their ambitious naval program. One can imagine Britain must have felt
threatened to see Germany threatening its hegemony on the seas. That the Reich was
doing so in its own backyard with a little island that used to be British further aggravated
any unease. Had Helgoland still been under London’s control, it would have been much

2

In 1898, for example, Germany acquired a sphere of influence on the Shantung
peninsula including the port Qingdao (Tsingtau). Germany also made other gains in the
Pacific region prior to World War I.
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harder for Berlin to challenge the British navy. Certainly, Germany still could have made
drastic increases in the size of its fleet, but without control of Helgoland, they would have
had a much harder time sending ships into the North Sea, leaving London in a strong
position to force Germany to scale back its navy.
Consequently, the common interests of the two empires embodied in the spirit of
the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty were thus eroded by the start of a naval arms race
between them. As the need to increase the size of the Reich grew, so did the desire to
defend it. Indispensable to protecting it was a strong fleet, impressive enough to compel
respect for their colonial claims and so powerful that no rival sea power could risk
attacking German overseas territory or interfering with their trade. To overcome
Germany’s inability to assist in overseas problems, the Kaiser, on several occasions,
urged the Reichstag to pass massive increases in the fleet in order to rival Britain’s both
in terms of size and strength. Another important part of these bills was the use of
Helgoland to construct these ships and give them safe harborage while they were entering
or leaving German waters.
It is no surprise then, that when Berlin embarked upon its very ambitious naval
program, London did not react favorably. British fears were aroused by such actions and
they reacted, as was only to be expected, by enacting their own massive naval increase.
Their relationship only grew worse as time passed and the size of the respective navies
grew. Just as colonial rivalries had stood in the way of a close Anglo-German friendship
in the 1880s, the rival navies stood as a new roadblock that never was overcome.

85

As Britain saw less and less of an opportunity to reach any further agreements
with Germany, it naturally drew closer to the other powers Berlin had alienated, namely
France and Russia, ultimately leading to the Entente Cordiale of 1904. These once
“natural allies” became foes who stood across from one another when the great
conflagration of war enveloped Europe in 1914. To the men of the British and German
governments, the Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty was seen as the beginning of positive
Anglo-German relations, but for historians blessed with the power of hindsight, the
opposite is true – such an agreement actually marked the end of a potentially strong
friendship between these two powers, and instead became one more piece in the
complicated puzzle that led to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.

APPENDIX I. TREATY OF HELGOLAND-ZANZIBAR 1890
The undersigned:
Chancellor and General of the Infantry von Caprivi,
Legation Councilor at the Foreign Office Dr. Krauel,
Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinaire and Plenipotentiary Sir
Edward Baldwin Malet,
Chief of the African Department of Her Majesty's Foreign Office Sir Henry
Percy,
Have, on behalf of their respective governments, reached the following agreement
after deliberating on various issues pertaining to the colonial interests of Germany and
Great Britain:
Article I. In East Africa, Germany's sphere of influence is demarcated thus:
1. To the north by the line that commences on the northern bank of the mouth of
the Umba River, runs directly to Lake Jipe and, after passing along the eastern shore and
around the northern shore of that lake, crosses the Lumi River and bisects the territories
of Taveta and Chaga. Skirting the northern slope of the Kilimanjaro range, this line
continues to the point on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria Nyanza that is intersected by
the 1st degree of south latitude. It crosses the lake on this parallel and follows it to the
border of the Congo Free State, where it terminates. It is understood, though, that the
German sphere of interest on the western side of the aforementioned lake does not
include Mount Mfumbiro. Should it turn out that this mountain lies to the south of the
aforementioned parallel of latitude, the line of demarcation shall be drawn so as to
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exclude the mountain from the German sphere of interest; but the line shall nonetheless
terminate at the previously described point.
2. To the south by the line that starts on the coast of the northern border of
Mozambique Province and follows the course of the Rovuma River to the point where the
Messinge flows into the Rovuma. From here the line runs westward on the parallel of
latitude to the shore of Lake Nyasa. Turning north, it continues along the eastern,
northern, and western shores of the lake until it reaches the northern bank of the mouth of
the Songwe River. It then continues up that river to its intersection point with the 33rd
degree of east longitude. The line continues along the river until its closest point with the
border of the geographical Congo Basin as described in Article I of the Berlin Conference
and marked on the map appended to its ninth protocol.
From here the line runs directly to the previously described border, follows this to
the point of intersection with the 32nd degree of east longitude, turns and continues
directly to the meeting point of the northern and southern branches of the Kilambo River.
It follows that river until it enters Lake Tanganyika.
The course of the planned border has been specified in accordance with the map
of the Nyasa Tanganyika Plateau that was officially drawn up for the British government
in 1889.
3. To the west by the line that coincides with the border of the Congo Free State
between the mouth of the Kilambo River and the 1st degree of south latitude.
In Southwest Africa, Great Britain's sphere of influence is demarcated thus:
1. To the south by the aforementioned line running from the mouth of the Umba
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River to the point on the border of the Congo Free State intersected by the 1st degree of
south latitude. It includes Mount Mfumbiro.
2. To the north by the line that, beginning on the shore of the northern bank of the
Juba River, runs along this bank and traces the border of the area reserved for Italian
influence in Gallaland and Abyssinia. It extends to the Egyptian borders.
3. To the west by the Congo Free State and by the western watershed of the Upper
Nile Basin.
Article II. To implement the demarcation line as described in the previous
article, Germany shall withdraw from its protectorate over Witu in favor of Great Britain.
Great Britain agrees to recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan of Witu over the area
extending from Kipini to the point opposite the Island of Kweihu defined as the border in
1887.
Furthermore, Germany shall give up its protectorate over the coastal area
bordering on Witu and extending to Kismayo. It shall also renounce its claims both to the
territories on the mainland north of the Tana River and to the islands of Patta and Manda.
Article III. In Southwest Africa, Germany's sphere of influence is demarcated thus:
1. To the south by the line that commences at the mouth of the Orange River and
continues up its northern bank to its intersection point with the 20th degree of east
longitude.
2. To the east by the line that commences at the aforementioned point and follows
the 20th degree of east longitude to its intersection point with the twenty-second degree
of south latitude. The line then traces this degree of latitude eastward to its intersection
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with the twenty-first degree of east longitude, follows this degree of longitude northward
to its intersection with the 18th degree of south latitude, runs along this degree of latitude
eastward to its intersection with the Chobe River. Here it descends the center of the main
channel until it meets the Zambezi, where it ends.
It is understood that under this arrangement Germany shall be granted free access
from its protectorate to the Zambezi by means of a strip of land not less than twenty
English miles wide at any point.
Great Britain's sphere of influence is bounded to the west and northwest by the
previously described line and includes Lake Ngami.
The course of the planned border has been specified in general accordance with
the map officially prepared for the British government in 1889.
The fixing of the southern border of the British territory of Walvis Bay shall be
subject to arbitration unless both powers reach a border agreement within two years after
the signing of this treaty. Both powers agree that, as long as the border issue is
unresolved, not only passage but the transport of goods through the disputed territory
shall be free for subjects of both powers. They also agree that their subjects shall be
treated equally in every respect in this territory. No duty shall be levied on goods in
transit and the territory shall be deemed neutral until such time as this issue is resolved.
Article IV. In West Africa:
1. The border between the German protectorate of Togo and Great Britain’s Gold
Coast Colony begins at the border mark determined by both powers’ commissioners
during negotiations on July 14 and 28, 1869. It extends northward to the parallel circle at
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sixth degree tenth minute north latitude. From there it traces this degree of latitude
westward to the left bank of the Aka River and ascends along the center to the parallel of
latitude at sixth degree twentieth minute north latitude. It follows this degree of latitude
westward to the right bank of the Dchawe or Shavoe River and runs along this bank to
the parallel of latitude defined by the intersection of the Deine River and the Volta. It
then traces this degree of latitude westward to the Volta. Here it ascends the left bank of
the Volta to the neutral zone agreed upon in the Treaty of 1888 that starts at the junction
of the Dakka River and the Volta.
Both parties agree upon conclusion of this treaty to withdraw all their civil
servants and employees from the territory that is assigned to the other by the borders
defined above.
2. After it has been satisfactorily proven to both governments that no river exists
on the Gulf of Guinea corresponding to the river that is marked on maps as the Rio del
Rey and mentioned in the Treaty of 1885, a provisional borderline shall be adopted
between the German territory of Cameroon and the adjoining British territory. This
borderline shall start at the head of the Rio del Rey Creek and run directly to the point at
roughly ninth degree eighth minute of east longitude marked as “Rapids” on the British
Admiralty map.
Article V. It is understood that treaties or agreements concluded by, or for the
benefit of, one of the two powers in the areas north of the Benue River shall not interfere
with the other power’s right to engage in trade, freely and without duties, on routes to and
from the shores of Lake Chad. Both powers are obliged to report to each other all
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agreements that they reach in the territories between the Benue and Lake Chado.
Article VI. Any correction of the demarcation lines described in Articles I to IV
that becomes necessary due to local requirements may be undertaken by agreement
between the two powers.
It is understood, in particular, that commissioners will meet as soon as possible to
undertake such a correction with regard to the borders described in Article IV.
Article VII. The two powers agree that they shall not interfere in the sphere of
influence assigned the other by Articles I to IV. They shall not, in the other‟s sphere of
influence, make acquisitions, sign treaties, accept sovereign rights or protectorates, or
prevent the other from expanding its influence.
It is understood that companies or individuals subject to one power shall not be
permitted to exercise sovereign rights in the sphere of influence assigned the other,
except with the consent of the latter.
Article VIII. Both powers agree to apply the provisions of the first five articles of
the General Act of the 1885 Berlin Conference in all areas of their territories located
within the free trade zone described in this Act and to which its first five articles are
applicable on the day of the conclusion of the present treaty. According to these
provisions, trade is free; shipping is free on lakes, rivers, canals and their ports for both
flags; unequal treatment as regards transport or coastal trade is prohibited; goods of either
origin shall not be subject to taxes other than those raised to cover trade-related outlays,
unequal treatment excluded. Transit duty may not be levied, and monopolies and
privileged commercial treatment may not be granted.
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The subjects of both powers have the right to settle freely in either power’s
territories, provided that these are located in the free trade zone.
It is understood, in particular, that, in accordance with these provisions, the
transport of goods by both sides shall not be subject to any obstacles or transit duties
between Lake Nyasa and the Congo Free State, between Lake Nyasa and Lake
Tanganyika, on Lake Tanganyika, and between this lake and the northern border of both
spheres of influence.
Article IX. Trading concessions, mining concessions, and property rights that
companies or private persons subject to one power have acquired within the sphere of
interest assigned the other shall be recognized by this latter power insofar as their validity
is satisfactorily proven. It is understood that concessions shall be pursued in accordance
with valid local laws and regulations.
Article X. The missionaries of both powers shall enjoy full protection in all
territories in Africa that belong to one of the two powers or are in its sphere of influence.
Religious tolerance, freedom of all forms of worship, and freedom of religious instruction
shall be ensured.
Article XI. Great Britain shall bring to bear her full influence on the Sultan of
Zanzibar to facilitate an amicable agreement by which the Sultan unconditionally cedes
to Germany the Island of Mafia and his territories on the mainland (including
dependencies) that are referred to in the existing concessions of the German East Africa
Company. It is understood that His Highness shall receive fair compensation for the loss
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of revenue resulting from this cessation.
Germany agrees to recognize the British protectorate over the remaining
territories of the Sultan of Zanzibar, including the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba.
Germany will also recognize the British protectorate over the territories of the Sultan of
Witu and the adjacent territory extending to Kismayo, from which the German
protectorate will be withdrawn. It is understood that, if the cessation of the German coast
has not been made before Great Britain assumes its protectorate over Zanzibar, Her
Majesty’s government, upon establishment of said protectorate, shall use all its influence
to induce the Sultan to make the cessation as soon as possible in return for fair
compensation.
Article XII. Concerning Helgoland:
1. Pending approval by the British parliament, Her British Majesty shall grant
sovereignty over the Island of Helgoland and all its facilities to His Majesty the German
Kaiser.
2. The German government shall grant natives of the ceded territory the right to
choose British citizenship by a declaration to be made by themselves or, in the case of
underage children, by their parents or guardians before January 1, 1892.
3. Natives of the ceded territory and their children born before the day on which
this treaty is signed shall be exempt from compulsory military service in the German
army and navy.
4. The currently valid local laws and practices will remain unchanged wherever
possible.
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5. The German government agrees not to raise, until January 1, 1910, the customs
tariffs currently in force in the ceded territory.
6. All property rights acquired by individuals or existing corporations in
Helgoland under the British government shall remain intact. Any obligations linked to
these shall pass to His Majesty the Emperor of Germany. The term “property rights”
includes Lloyd’s signaling rights.
7. The rights of British fishermen shall remain unaffected, including the right to
anchor in all weather, take on provisions and water, make repairs, transship goods, sell
fish, land and dry nets.
Berlin, July 1, 1890
von Caprivi
R. Krauel
Edward B. Malet
H. Percy Anderson

APPENDIX II. MAPS
A. Helgoland and the North Sea

Source: George Drower, Heligoland: The True Story of the German Bight and the Island
that Britain Betrayed (Sutton Publishing: Gloucestershire, 2002).

95

B. Africa 1912

Source: Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy, 1814-1914 (New York: McGraw Hill,
1990)
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C. East Africa Prior to 1890 and the Borders Proposed by the Germans and British

Source: Gene Albert Mueller, The Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty of July 1, 1890 (Eugene,
OR: University of Oregon Press, 1965).
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